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SUMMARY 
1. Farm leasing represents an important aspect of the 
resource service market in agriculture and can have im-
portant effects on efficiency of agricultural production. 
2. This is an initial study comparing and examining 
farming practices and efficiency under crop-share and' cash 
leases. 
3. Empirical observations covering the year 1949 were 
made on 146 sample farms on a relatively homogeneous 
soil area in Benton and Tama counties. 
4. Both crop-share and cash leases were found to in-
troduce uncertainty into farm planning as a result of short-
term leases. 
5. Risk resulting from fixed rental payments which 
reduced the tenants' effective equity was peculiar to the 
cash lease. 
6. Where landlord and tenant were members of the 
same family, the effects of risk and uncertainty were found 
to be somewhat modified. 
7. Budget analysis showed greater variability of re-
turns under cash than under share leases as a result of the 
fixed rental fees of the cash lease. 
8. A tendency for cash-lease farms to be smaller than 
share-lease farms was disclosed. 
9. Few significant differences in intensity of produc-
tion were found although it was demonstrated that the 
leases do affect the cost and returns structure of the busi-
ness. 
10. Average capital position was stronger on cash 
farms than on crop-share, and there was some tendency 
among tenants to shift to a cash basis where possible when 
they acquired the necessary capital position to withstand 
the risks involved. 
11. Whereas the cash tenant's rent is in the form of a 
fixed cost and doesn't affect the crop combinations grown, 
the share tenant pays different proportions of each crop as 
rent. Adjustment in the share rent of one crop to compen-
sate for a high or low share of another affects the cropping 
pattern in favor of ,the enterprise for which the cost is rela-
tively lowered. 
12. Where share rent levels do not give equitable returns 
to the landlord, adjusting the expense shares and pro-
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duct shares into line with productivity of the resources 
would solve the problem and still maintain efficient farming. 
13. Most tenants preferred cash leases and believed 
them most profitable from the tenant's standpoint. However, 
because of the greater risk involved in cash renting, they 
indicated a preference for smaller farms if they were to rent 
under cash leases even at a relatively lower rent. 
14. About one-half of the farmers would operate the 
farms differently if they owned them, with most changes be-
ing made in buildings and cropping systems. 
15. To bring about efficient use of resources and patterns 
of production, rental rates should approach the marginal pro-
ductivity of landlord resources. There were some indications 
that this condition had not been met in the particular area 
during the year under consideration. 
16. Imperfections of the leases resulting in inefficiences 
are not inherent in the lease types. Rather they have grown 
up through custom and tradition. Some constructive adjust-
ments that might be made in present leases are: 
a. Sliding scale or flexible cash leases to allow rental 
payments to fluctuate with farm prices and yields. 
b. Longer leases and/or compensation for unexhausted 
resources. 
c. Division of expenses under crop-share leases in the 
same manner in which the product is shared. 
d. Premiums to compensate for low landlord returns, 
when and if they occur under share leases, made in 
the form of a flat rate per acre or per farm. 
Relationship of Crop-Share and Cash 
Leasing Systems to Farming Efficiency1 
By EARL o. HEADY AND EARL w. KEHRBERG . 
Farmers have numerous methods of obtaining control of 
the productive services of resources. They can buy the re-
sources outright and utilize their services. This is the main 
method by which the productive services of seed, machinery, 
feed, livestock and other forms of capital are obtained. 
Although a market exists whereby the services of machines 
and livestock (chiefly breeding stock) can be hired on a cus-
tom basis, farmers usually purchase the entire stock of ser-
vices embodied in these resources and then utilize the ser-
vices as they flow forth over time in the production process. 
At the opposite extreme, the services of labor are always 
hired; a market does not exist whereby a laborer and the 
stock of productive services which he represents can be pur~ 
chased outright. Between these two extremes fall the ser-
vices of land, buildings and other real estate. The entire stock 
of productive services embodied in real estate can be pur-
chased and the farmer then becomes an owner-operator. 
However, the flow of productive services from land and build-
ings can also be purchased without resort to ownership. 
Services of real estate can be hired by tenant operators 
through various types of leasing arrangements. Real estate 
services may be purchased for a year or other period de-
pending on the term of the lease. 
. Thus farm leasing represents one phase of the resource 
service market in agriculture. Farm leasing should be looked 
upon in the same manner as the market for other resource 
services. It has an important contribution to make to agri-
cultural production. In Iowa about 42 percent of the farms 
and 50.8 percent of the farm land was operated under some 
form of lease in 1949. While this represents a somewhat 
smaller fraction of the total stock of farm real estate than 
in earlier years (see table 1) it still represents an import-
ant portion of land area in the state. Leasing should and 
will continue to play an important role in the state's agri-
culture. 
1 Project 1135. Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station. 
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TABLE 1. FARM ACREAGE OPERATED UNDER LEASING CONTRACT, 
1938-49, IN THE STATE OF IOWA. 
Acreage In farms 
Acreage owned by operator 
Percentage of total acreage owned 
by operator 
Acreage rented by operator 
Percentage of total acreage rented 
by operator 
1 
Av. 1938-1 1948 1947 1949 
34,656,679 I 34,725,282134,743,644 
16,106,600 116,905,421 17,111.130 
I I 
46.5 I 48.7 I 49.2 
18.550.178 117.819.861 117,632,514 
53.5 I 51.3 I 60.8 
Source: State of Iowa, Annual Farm Census 1949. 
State of Iowa, Des Moines. Iowa. 1960. 
LEASING SYSTEMS AND FARMING EFFICIENCY 
Prices for productive services perform two functions in 
an enterprise economy. On the one hand they provide per-
sonal income to the owner of the resource. On the other hand 
they serve to help guide resources into their most produc-
tive uses and help direct the most efficient combination of 
resources. Accordingly, leasing systems as one facet of re-
source-service pricing have the same functions to perform in 
agriculture. Leasing arrangements thus pose two questions: 
1. What is a "fair" rental arrangement from the standpoint 
of returns to either the landlord or tenant? 2. What leasing 
arrangements and rental rates facilitate the most ,efficient 
agricultural production? 
In an economic system which depends upon prices for 
allocation of resources (in a manner consistent with scarce 
quantities of land, labor and capital' and the wishes of con-
sumers), "fair rents" can be defined in this way: Fair or 
equitable rents are those which return to each resource or 
property owner the contribution which his resources make 
to total production on the farm.2 To the extent that market 
rental rates approximate returns to property owners in a 
manner indicative of the quantity and productivity of their 
resources, they are most appropriate from the standpoint 
of production efficiency. If leasing arrangements are to be 
used as a device to channel resource services into their most 
productive use, rental rates should not be used to redis-
tribute income between the landlord and the tenant. Rental 
rates should not be lowered below the market level to give 
a tenant a greater income or raised above this level to give 
• In other words, the return to landlord and tenant as a resource owner 
si).ould be the marginal product of the resources which each contributes 
to the production process. For added details on this point see Heady. 
"Economics of leasing systems." Jour. Farm Econ .• Aug. 1947. 
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the landlord a greater income. Other means exist whereby 
income transfers can be made and, if acceptable to society, 
allow rental. rates to retain the function of bringing about 
efficient production. 
From the standpoint of the individual resource owner, 
efficiency of the leasing system generally refers to a rental 
arrangement which will maximize the income of the tenant 
or landlord over a relevant time-period. Since the landlord 
or tenant is also a consumer, it is important to analyze 
leasing arrangements from the over-all efficiency standpoint. 
Production is not an end in itself but rather a means to 
consumption and the maximization of satisfaction. Where 
prices serve with some degree of effectiveness in reflecting 
(1) consumers' wishes and (2) the relative scarcity of re-
sources, efficiency of leasing systems can be denoted by the 
size of the total farm income over a long time-period. It 
is not the income to the tenant or landlord in a single year 
which is important but rather the combined income of the 
two over a period long enough that all aspects of efficient 
farming can be reflected. (This does not mean that a single 
tenant must remain on the farm over time but only that the 
returns to the landlords and the several tenants who may 
operate the farm must be at a maximum.) Income of a 
farm is ordinarily maximized over a long period of time if 
the products produced conform to the wishes of the con-
suming public. If consumers place a high value on another 
product, market prices generally reflect these wishes. The 
farmer can then realize greatest returns if he combines his 
enterprises in line with market prices. 
Similarly, the costs or prices attached to labor, capital 
and other resources indirectly suggest the manner in which 
the consuming society wishes productive services to be used. 
With this in mind the farmer can maximize returns in a 
manner consistent with the wishes of society as expressed in 
the market (1) if he employs techniques of production and 
combines the productive elements in a manner which will 
minimize his costs and (2) if he extends the total scale of 
his operations in a manner consistent with the costs of 
production items and the returns he realizes from them. In 
leasing, extending the use of variable resources (such as 
fertilizer) in combination with fixed resources (such as an 
acre of land) is an important aspect of the latter condition. 3 
From a resource or farming efficiency standpoint, a lease 
• In the technical terminology of economics, these conditions can be attained 
only If (a) the marginal rate of substitution of the different production fac. 
tors Is (Inversely) equal to their price ratios, and (b) the marginal cost 
of resources Is equated with the marginal return of the same resources. 
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thus becomes imperfect if it does not result in (1) a com-
bination of resources or techniques which minimizes costs 
for any given output, (2) a combination of enterprises which 
maximizes returns from a given cost outlay, (3) a scale 
of enterprise consistent with the normal risk and uncertain-
ty of the market. Owner operation does not guarantee that. 
these conditions of efficiency will be attained. Accordingly, 
efficiency of leasing systems is a relative matter. The de-
gree to which farming efficiency is or is not attained can 
be measured only in terms of other tenure arrangements or 
perhaps in terms of the particular inefficiencies which grow 
out of leasing systems. 
OBJECTIVES 
This study is an initial one dealing with the effect of 
leasing systems on farming efficiency. Many rental arrange-
ments are employed in Iowa. The most common of these is 
the crop-share lease wherein rent is paid in the form of a 
share of grain crops. The landlord furnishes the real estate 
while the tenant furnishes the working capital, labor and 
most of the operating expenses. Some expenses such as seed 
are shared. Cash rent is ordinarily paid for use of hay and 
pasture land under this system of leasing. Next in number 
are the livestock share leases. Here the landlord furnishes 
the real estate, the tenant furnishes the labor and machinery, 
and the two together provide livestock, feed, seed and 
other operating expenses. Straight cash leases are least 
prevalent in Iowa. Under this leasing arrangement, the ten-
ant rents the land for a fixed rate per acre or for the farm 
as a whole. While many variations exist in the numerous 
forms of leasing, the census listed 41.8 percent of the rented 
farms operated under crop-share4 contracts in 1945. In the 
same year 26.8 percent were operated under share-cash leases 
and 24.6 percent under cash leases. 
Numerous hypotheses and observations exist relative to 
the effect of leasing arrangements on farming efficiency.5 
However, in order to keep the study manageable in terms 
• Note that the census definitions of leases do not correspond exactly to those 
used In this study. 
The 1945 census defines all farms on which the rent Is paid as a share 
of the livestock or crop product as crop·share. 'Where cash rent is paid in 
addition to the crop or livestock share, the census defines the lease as 
share-cash. Most of the farms defined as crop·share in this study fall 
under the share-cash classification. 
• For detailed discussions of the hypotheses, see Heady, "Economics of leas-
ing systems," Jour. Farm Econ., AUg". 1947; Schickele, "Leases and farm. 
ing efficiency," Jour. Farm Econ., Dec. 1942; Johnson, "Resource alloca-
tion under share contracts," Jour. Political Econ., April 1950; and Heady, 
"Share leases and the Inter-product allocation of resources," South. Econ. 
Jour., Jan. 1952. 
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of the funds available, it has been restricted to conventional 
share and cash leasing arrangements. Analysis of livestock-
share and part-owner operation will be made at a later time. 
This study attempts to measure and compare farming efficien-
cy under share and cash leasing arrangements in a restricted 
soil area of East Central Iowa. The summary also describes 
and lists the characteristics of rental arrangements on the 
farms included in the sample. 
It is possible that different imperfections are inherent in 
both share and cash leases. Thus a direct comparison between 
the two cannot always be taken to indicate the degree of 
efficiency or inefficiency which stems from leasing. On the 
one hand, the cash lease may encourage efficient farming 
in terms of the division of costs and returns. On the other 
hand it may discourage efficiency through the cash rent out-
lay. The opposite characteristics may be inherent in share 
leases. Thus while one characteristic of either lease may en-
courage efficiency, it may be offset by another characteristic 
which discourages efficiency. Lack of difference between 
leasing systems may indicate either that (a) both are equally 
efficient or (b) both are equally inefficient from the stand-
point of resource use. 
The purpose of the study, however, is to describe and 
predict the income, farming practices, patterns of resource 
use and similar efficiency characteristics which attach to 
cash and share leases in the area sampled. Analysis is also 
made of tenant-landlord relationship and other forces which 
may be more important than the leasing method in encourag-
ing efficient production and resource use. 
The study deals only with the farm management and 
production economics (efficiency) aspects of leasing systems. 
It is not concerned with the legal status of leasing arrange-
ments', the historic evolution of rental systems and other of 
the conventional land tenure or institutional aspects of tenure 
systems. While these considerations are important they are 
not within the scope of this study. 
SAMPLE AND EMPIRICAL PROCEDURE 
The purpose of this study is to examine differences in 
farms operated under crop-share and cash leases with respect 
to farming practices and resource efficiency. The investi-
gation is not concerned with the frequency of farms operated 
under different leasing systems in any particular area of 
Iowa or for the state as a whole. In some instances the 
models and hypotheses to be tested in this study involve the 
extent to which some practice (as a reflection of action under 
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different lease types) is found on cash or share farms. For 
instance, application of lime; what percent of the farmers 
under each type of lease apply lime? In other cases a mean 
or average is important for comparisons. What is the aver-
age livestock output per farm or per acre for units operated 
under either of the two leases? These simple probability 
statements can be procured through use of a sample strati-
fied by lease type. 
A simple random sample would not give equal information 
about both cash and crop-share farms. It would be over-
weighted with crop-share farms since they are the more 
numerous in the total population of rented farms. It is also 
true that the density of cash and share leases differs between 
soil areas. One of the greatest concentrations of cash leases 
is found in the geographic location of this study. Share leases 
are most heavily concentrated on Clarion and Webster soils 
in the North Central Cash Grain Area of Iowa (although the 
crop-share lease predominates in all regions of Iowa). A 
purely random sample drawn from the whole of Iowa would 
not only include a larger proportion of share leases but would 
also confound the effects of soil type and location with the 
effects of the rental. systems. Differences in rainfall, soil 
fertility and topography directly affect the enterprise com-
binations, the amount of resources and the practices found 
on farms. Therefore, this study was restricted to a sample 
. of rented farms in a homogeneous soil area. Nineteen con-
tiguous townships 6 on Tama and Muscatine soils in Benton 
and Tama counties were chosen and the rented farms strati-
fied by lease type. 
The means, variances and other statistics of this study 
are not used as estimates of population parameters for all 
rented farms in the state. They are used only to determine 
whether cash and share-rented farms represent different 
populations in respect to resource use and farming efficien-
cy in a single soil area. While this procedure prevents re-
fined empirical estimates of the effect of lease types on 
Iowa agriculture as a whole, the principles uncovered in the 
study of this geographically limited sample may be applied 
to farms in other areas with some degree of confidence. 
An initial step in designing the sample included compiling 
a list of all rented farms, crop-share and cash. Lists of all 
of the farms in the sampled area were made available by 
the AAA offices. These lists designated farms operated by 
• In Benton: Bruce, Monroe, Jackson, Homer, Big Grove, Eden, Kane, Union, 
Eldorado, Iowa and LeRoy. 
In Tama: Lincoln, Grant, Buckingham, Geneseo, Spring Creek, Crystal, 
Perry and Clark. 
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owners, part owners and tenants. They did not indicate the 
type of lease on the rented farms. Lists of the rented farms 
were then taken to the AAA township committeemen and 
former committeemen familiar with the farms to determine 
the type of lease in force. A complete list of the cash-leased 
farms in the area was compiled in this manner. A list of the 
crop-share farms was then compiled from which the crop-
share farm nearest to each cash-leased farm was selected. A 
systematic sample of every fifth farm (after a random start) 
was taken from the list of cash lease landlords. It was 
assumed that the statistics derived from this type of sample 
would give estimates paralleling those from an actual ran-
dom sample and would also be more convenient to draw. A 
total of 74 pairs or 148 farms were selected in all. Two 
cash-lease farms were eventually disqualified when it was 
found that the operator also operated land which he owned. 
In view of the objectives of this study, the crop-share 
farm nearest (on the basis of proximity of farmstead) to 
each cash lease was chosen for the sample. This method was 
also selected as a means of reducing travel expenses. It 
was assumed that crop-share farms selected in this manner 
would be reasonably representative of all crop-share farms 
in the area. It appeared unlikely that the extra accuracy to 
be gained by a pure random selection would warrant the 
extra expense. 
Farms chosen in close geographic proximity are expected 
to have less variance in their methods and practices since 
they are on more nearly the same kinds of soiJ.7 Practices 
such as contouring, terracing, green manuring are affected 
by conditions of soil type and topography as well as by the 
lease. As long as soil and location are as nearly alike as 
possible, differences in the farming practices mentioned can 
be more nearly attributed to other causes such as leasing 
arrangementS. 
For the purposes of this study, inclusion of crop-share 
leases typical of the area was not as important as inclusion 
of crop-share farms comparable with cash farms in respect 
to soil type and topography. The crop-share farms adjacent 
to cash-lease farms, therefore, were considered as the entire 
population of crop-share farms most important in this stUdy. 
Each of these had an equal opportunity of falling into the 
sample although not all crop-share farms in the area did. 
• Exceptions occur where geographic proximity does not insure similarity of 
soils. However, in general one expects to find farms in the same general 
area made up of the same kinds of soil. 
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BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE FARMS 
Little has previously been known about rental rates in the 
area sampled. Accordingly; this section is devoted to a de-
scription of the general background and leasing arrange-
ments found on the farms sampled. Later sections provide 
statistics on the nature of resource use and practices which 
relate to leasing systems. 
TABLE 2. BACKGROUND FOR CASH AND CROP·SHARE LEASES. 
Items (average 
for farms in 
the group) 
Value of land per acre 
Acres field rented by 
operator 
No. of years operator 
rented this farm 
No. of years operator 
rented this farm for 
cash or share t 
1 
Cash 1 Crop-share 
Relatedlre~~~d.1 Av. Related] r!l'~r~d I Av_ 
1$255.381 U46.471 $251.37\ $266.781 $254.911 $257.80 
I 4.38 1 1.97 1 3.31 1 1.8 I 4.2 I 3.6 
I 11.051 6.9 1 8.90 I 6.21 6.4 5.6 
I 9.551 6.22 8.0 I 5.8 I 4.9 5.2 
• The terms "related" and "nonrelated" refer to whether the landlord and 
~enant are related, e. g., brothers, father and son, brother-In-law and father-
m-Iaw, etc. 
t TYllA of lease refers to type under which the farm was rented In 1949. 
Operators; estimates of per-acre values of the farms in-
cluding buildings did not differ significantly. Homogeneity in 
real estate value was 'expected because the sample was de-
signed to obtain a homogeneous cropping area. Cash oper-
ators and crop-share operators differed by only $4.49 per 
acre in their average estimates of land value per acre. 
Field renting (i. e.; renting of unimproved cropland or 
pasture to supplement the base unit with buildings); which 
is one method of increasing scale of farm operations; was 
found to be relatively unimportant in the sampled area. The 
amount of field renting averaged under 4 acres per farm 
for the 146 sample farms. The average was 42 acres for 
the 12 farms which did field rent. 
Cash tenants had a slightly longer average tenure on 
the same farm than did crop-share tenants. Both groups of 
tenants had rented (the farm they were now operating) on 
a cash or share basis for approximately the same number 
of years. (Only a few had changed type of lease on the same 
farm; as is evident by the figures of table 2.) 
CROP-SHARE PROVISIONS 
Crop-share farm operators pay a portion of the farm 
crop-product as rent and, as the term is used in this study; 
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they also customarily pay a cash pasture rent. Other pro-
visions of payment vary from lease to lease. The input of 
productive services is also shared, with land being furnished 
by the landlord and the tenant furnishing his own labor 
but not necessarily hired labor. Other provisions for sharing 
of productive services vary. A breakdown of the share pro-
visions of the leases in the sample appears in table 3. 
TABLE 3. CROP-SHARE LEASE TERMS. 
Item \ Related I r~~r~d I All share 
1. Percent paying ¥.. corn 
I 
100 I 98.2 98.6 Percent paying more than % corn 0 0 0 
Percent paying less than ¥.. corn 0 1.8 1.4 
2. Percent paying 2/5 oats 44.4 85.7 75.7 
Percent paying more than 2/5 oats I 55.6 12.5 23.0 Percent paying less than 2/5 oats 0 1.8 1.3 3. Percent paying 1,1, soybeans. 63.6 35.9 42.0 
Percent paying more than ¥.. soybeans I 0 2.6 2.0 Percent paying less than I 
1,1, soybeans I 36.4 61.5 56.0 4. Percent of farms on which share is given 
for hay 16.7 3.6 4.0 
5. Percent of farms paying cash for hay and 
pasture 88.7 100 97.3 
6. Av. no. acres on whiCh cash is paid 33.1 52.8 48.0 
7. Av. cash paymcnt per acre for hay and pas-
ture on those farms making such payment 6.06 7.28 7.09 
8. Percent of farms paying lump-sum casht I 5.6 5.4 4.0 
9. AV. amt. lump-sum cash (on farms making 
such payment) 400 40.33 173.67 
10. Pcrcent of landlords who pay fertilizer share 61.1 58.9 59.4 
11. Percent of landlords who pay share seed COrn I 61.1 44.6 48.6 
12. Percent of landlords who pay share seed oats 44.4 7.1 16.2 
13. Percent of landlords who pay share seed 
beans 
I 
44.4 16.1 23.0 
14. Percent landlords who pay share grass and 
legume seed 94.4 98.2 97.3 
15. Percent landlords who pay share of corn 
picking 11.1 0 2.7 
16. Percent of landlords who pay share of 
corn shelling 61.1 62.5 62.2 
17. Percent landlords who pay share of oat 
harvest 27.8 8.9 13.5 
18. Percent of landlords who pay share of 
hay harvest 5.6 1.8 2.7 
19. Percent landlords who pay share of we cd 
spray 44.4 50 48.6 
20. Av. ncrcent fert. cost paid by landlords who 
share this cost 68.2 55.1 
a. Av. percent seed corn 50.0 51.6 51.1 
b. Av. percent seed oats 50.0 50.0 50.0 
c. Av. percent secd beans 50.0 50.0· 50.0 
d. Av. percent grass seed 88.2 92.3 92.0 
c. Av. percent corn picking 50.0 0 50.0 
f. Av. percent corn shelling 54.5 54.3 54.3 
g. Av. percent oat harvest 60.0 50.0 55.0 
h. Av. percent hay harvest 50.0 50.0 50.0 
1. A v. percent weed spray 75.0 78.6 77.8 
21. Percent tenants paying costs associated 
with real estate 5.6 16.1 13.5 
·Slnce soybeans are not raised on all farms, these shares refer only to those 
who answered. ' , 
tRents for better than average buildings or other improvements. 
Rental payments of one-half share of the corn produced 
were practically universal on the sample farms. Less than 
2.5 percent of the tenants paid less and none paid more. This 
provision is one established by custom and is found to vary 
646 
somewhat and to change slowly in given areas. Farther north, 
i. e., in the Dakotas and parts of Minnesota, one~third or 
two-fifths becomes the common share. However, crop-share 
rental rates are fairly uniform over Iowa even though soils 
and yields vary considerably. 8 
The most common share of oats paid as rent was two-
fifths. Approximately three-fourths of the crop-share sample 
farm leases contained such a provision for rents of this pro-
portion for oats. The next common share arrangement called 
for a one-half-share of oats. A little over one-half of the 
crop-share farmers gave two-fifths of the soybeans. A one-
half-share arrangement for soybeans was found on two-fifths 
of the farms. Only 4 percent of the crop-share farmers gave 
a share of the hay. Even then they paid cash for pasture 
rent. 
'The shares of the various crops which the lease desig-
nates as the reward for the services of the tenant and land-
lord become established through custom. Within anyone 
area they are quite consistent. Corn has been grown for a 
relatively long period of time in this area and the shares 
have become well fixed. Soybeans for grain, on the other 
hand, are a relatively new crop, making their appearance 
in fairly large amounts only as early as the 1930's. It might 
be expected that the division of this crop would not settle 
down to a single share in a decade. On the other hand, oats 
have been raised in the area since it was settled. Yet a con-
sistent share arrangement still does not exist between farms. 
Differences in the manner in which the oats crop is divided 
have become more prevalent in recent years. The tendency 
seems to be to shift from a two-fifths share to one-half share 
to the landlord. Probably the impact of new seeds with the 
landlord sharing seed costs has something to do with this 
situation. Also, oats were essential to the tenant principally 
for horse feed in the past but today are more nearly a cash 
or feed crop in the manner of soybeans or hay. The change 
in oats harvesting methods may be another factor involved 
in this variation in share rentals. 
Productive services such as fertilizer, seed and harvesting 
costs are often shared. About two-fifths of the crop-share 
lease arrangements called for sharing of fertilizer costs, with 
50-50 share as the most common arrangement. Approxi-
mately one-half of the leases provided for sharing of seed 
corn with 50-50 the most common share. Less than one-
fourth of the crop-share leases contained provisions for shar-
ing oats seed and soybean seed expense. On those farms on 
8 Beneke, Raymond and Heady, Earl O. Sizing up the crop share lease. Iowa 
Farm Science, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. Oct. 1947. 
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which oats and soybean seed costs were shared, the arrange-
ments typically called for a 50-50 division of the expense. 
Grass and legume seed are largely landlord responsi-
bilities in the sampled area; 97.3 percent of the leases pro-
vided for the landlord's bearing the full expense of grass 
and legume seed. When the leases provided for sharing this 
expense, the landlords paid an average of 92 percent of the 
expense. 
Harvesting expenses are less commonly shared. Only 2.7 
percent of the leases provided for sharing corn picking and/or 
hay harvest costs. Oat harvest costs were shared by 13.5 per-
cent of the landlords. Weed spray is becoming a commonly 
shared expense. About half of the leases provided that the 
landlord share this expense, and the average share paid by 
those landlords sharing it was 77.8 percent. 
TERMS OF CASH LEASES 
The average cash rent paid under cash leases in the 
sample amounted to $10.29 per acre. Tenants related to their 
landlords averaged $9.87 (42 cents less than the average 
payments where tenants were not related to their landlords). 
The difference is not statistically significant. Some sharing 
of productive service ~nputs does take place under the cash 
lease arrangements. Fifty percent of the landlords shared 
fertilizer and/or seed expenses. Sharing of grass seed and 
lime was most common. Only 2.7 percent of the cash farms 
reported provision for sharing fertilizer costs. 
While buildings are usually looked upon as a landlord 
service, one-third of the cash tenants reported paying some 
of the costs associated with building maintenance. Payment 
of building expense was found approximately twice as often 
on related as on nonrelated farms. 
Variable rental payments to compensate for crop failure 
or "hard times" appeared in only 16.6 percent of the cash 
leases. 
TABLE 4. LEASE TER:\IS FOR CASH LEASES. 
Item I Related Non· All related cash 
1. Average cash rent paid per acre 
I 
$ 9.87 $10.50 $10.29 
2. Percent tenants paying some of the 
costs associated with buildings 42.5 21.9 33.8 
3. Percent landlords paying part of fer· I 
tlllzer, seed, etc. 47.5 53.1 50.0 
4. Percent of farms whiCh vary rental pay-
ments with changes in price or yield I 17.5 15.6 16.6 
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FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 
Efficiency effects of family relationships between land-
lord and tenant are kept in mind throughout this study since 
they may have a greater impact on resource allocation and 
use than the type of the lease. Family relationship between 
tenant and landlord is much more prevalent under the cash 
lease than under share lease. Over one-half of the cash ten-
ants were related to the landlord. The figure for share farms 
is only one-half this amount. Also, the fact that a greater 
percentage of the cash leases are oral grows out of the family 
relationships and the greater confidence which family mem-
bers have in each other. Table 5 shows the prevalence of oral 
and written leases. Family relationships may reduce risk and 
uncertainty involved in farming, as is shown in the next sec-
tion. 
TABLE 5. FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS UNDER CASH LEASES. 
I Cash I Crop-share 
Related I r::~r~d I All Non· All cash Related I related 1 share 
I I I I I No. of operators related I lated to landlord I 
I 
I I 100 Percent 55.6 44.4 100 24.3 I 75.7 No. 40 32 72 18 56 74 
Oral leases, percent I 57.5 19.4 40.8 61.1 I 25.0 33.8 
'Vrltten leases, percent I 42.5 80.6 59.2 1 38.9 I 
75.0 66.2 
Average lease iength, I 
yrs.* I 1.2 1.4 1.3 I 1 1.4 1.3 
• The term of the lease as expressed In the contract-not the average length 
of tenancy. 
UNCERTAINTY AND RISK 
Various forces affect the degree of uncertainty involved 
in operating a rented farm. Some of the differences here are 
unique to the particular type of lease (e. g., the equity con-
siderations discussed later). In other cases (such as the 
length of lease) one rental system gives rise to as much un-
certainty and short-time planning as the other. Relationship 
to the landlord may also cause the tenant to view his oper-
ations with less uncertainty. 
Perhaps cash tenants have selected this type of lease 
because their capital position allows the assuming of risks. 
As is indicated in table 6, cash tenants included in the sample 
had both somewhat higher equities and a greater total 
amount of capital than share tenants. Generally it is true 
that a beginning farmer who can gather together only the 
funds to start farming will select a share lease in preference 
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TABLE 6. CAPITAL POSITION. 
Item I Cash I Crop-share 
Related I r~~r;d I c~!h Related I r~~r~d I st1~e 
Total dollars In· 
1 I I vested in livestock 
per farm 7,719.78 8,325.00
1 
7,888.76 1i,069.60 6,355.93 6,043.04 
Total tenant Invest-
ment per farm 12,671.04113,289.48112,945.90 9,589.34 l1,1i77.42 11,093.83 
Total liabilities of I I I I II tenant per farm I 1,031.751 396.77 754.59 2,566.67 1,232.68 1,422.03 
Net wO)"th of tenant ! I 
per farm 11,639.291 2,892.71112,191.31' 7,022.67 1.0,344.74 9,671.80 
Percent equity of I I I I 
tenant per farm 91.8 97.0 94.2 73.2 89.4 87.2 
to a cash lease. Cash leases are looked upon as involving too 
much risk for the operator short on capital or inexperienced 
in farming operations. 
TIME SPAN OF THE LEASE 
Different degrees of uncertainty involved in leasing may 
arise because of the length of tenure. Cash or share leases 
are not unique in this respect. A 1-year lease places a pre-
mium on short-term planning in either case. For a lease 
which will definitely be terminated in 1 year, the return to 
the tenant on resources such as lime or fertilizer is di-
minished by the amount of the product or yield to be ex-
pected in the second and subsequent years. 
In table 7 over four-fifths of both cash and crop:.share 
leases were for 1 year. Only 11.2 percent each of cash and 
of crop-share tenants had leases for 4 years or more; In this 
respect both systems of leasing involve equal amounts of 
tenure uncertainty. 
As a check on the indication of uncertainty offered by the 
time span of the lease, the respondents were asked for the 
number of chances out of 100 they had of continuing to oper-
ate the farm 1, 2, 4, 6 or more years. When the tenant ex-
pressed the viewpoint of having a 60 percent or better chance 
of staying 4 years, he was arbitrarily classified as being 
fairly certain of tenure of that period. Likewise, a tenant 
who expressed an opinion of less than 60 percent probability 
of staying 6 years but a 60 percent or better chance of stay-
ing 4 years was classified as being fairly certain of 4-year 
tenure. The lesser periods of certainty of tenure were figured 
in an analogous'manner and the results from the question 
tabulated in table 7. 
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TABLE 7. LEASE SPECIFICATIONS. 
Cash 
Item 
Percent landlords that 
specify cropping sys-
tem· 
Percent landlords that 
specify manure 
spreading 
Percent of farms with 
written leases 
Average length of lease 
contract: 
17.5 II, 46.9 
12.5 2.5 
42.5 , 80.6 
Percent with lease 
for 1 year 
Percent with lease 
for 2 years 
Percent with lease 
for 3 years 
Percent with lease 
for 4 years 
Percent with lease 
for 5 ·years 
Percent with lease 
for 6 years 
Percent wltn lease 
for more than 6 
years 
1 I 1.4 
I 90 I 80.6 
I 2.5 , 3.2 
I ~: I, 1::: 
I I 
Av. no. "most llkely" I ' years operator ex- I 
peets to be on farm: 'I ' Percent less than 2 \ 
years 12.5 18.8 
Percent certaint of \ 
operating for 2 , 
years I 15 31.2 
Percent certain of \ I 
operating for 4 
years 7.5 18.8 
Percent certain of I I 
operating for 6 
years 65 31.2 
• Includes: 
30.6 
8.3 
59.2 
1.3 
85.9 
2.8 
7 
1.4 
2.8 
15.3 
22.2 
12.5 
50 . 
I . r=~:~ar All Related related share 
I I " 55.6 46.4 I 48.7 
5.6 5.4 5.4 
38.9 I 75.0 
1 I 1.4 
I 100 76.8 7.1 
I 12.5 
I 1.8 
11.1 I 
1.8 
28.6 
11.1 
I 
17.8 
14.3 
77.8 
, 
39.3 
66.2 
1.3 
82.4 
3.4 
9.4 
1.4 
1.4 
24.3 
16.2 
10.8 
48.7 
1. cases where croppln~ system Is set up by mutual agreement. 
2. Cases where maximum no. acres corn are fixed in lease. 
3. Cases where any minimum acreage of land Is to be seeded down or 
planted to oats. 
tCertaln (fairly) of 6 years where the probabU1ty Is more than 60% (6 out 
of 10) that operator will be on farm for 6 years. . 
Certain of 4 years where the probabmty Is less than 60 % for 6 years but 
greater than 60 % for 4 years. 
Certain of 2 years where the probabl11ty Is less than 60% for 4 years. 
Approximately one-half of the tenants were "subjective-
ly" certain of operating 6 years on the farm which they 
occupied. Using the above definitions, distinction should be 
made between related and nonrelated tenants, however. The 
majority of related tenants felt that their chances of stay-
ing 6 years were little worse than staying shorter periods. 
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EFFECTS OF TENURE UNCERTAINTY 
Tenure uncertainty may have many effects upon the ef-
ficiency with which resources are used. Mainly it places a 
premium on short-run investments and cropping systems by 
the tenant. The possibilities here can be illustrated with the 
data of table 8. Although the figures apply to a different soil 
type, the principle involved applies equally to other soil types 
TABLE 8. DOLLAR VALUE OF YIELD INCREASES PER ACRE 
ON CLARION SOIL. 
Rate I Cost 0-20-0 of 
lbs./A. 0-20-0 I Oats lIst year I Hay I Bushels I Value ~J~t~ Tons I Value 
Ug I\Ug 
1200 22.80 
I I I 
1
18.0 1$13.50 $10.65 0.86 $17.20 
25.1 18.82 13.12 1.22 24.40 
27.5 "I 20.63 9.23 1.82 36.40 
16.6 112.45 -10.35 I 2.81 56.20 
Total 
cron 
value 
$37.00 
43.22 
57.03 
68.65 
I Profit over fer-
t1l1zer 
costs 
I 
1$34.15 37.52 I 45.63 46.85 
Note: Fertilizer cost $38 per ton; oats valued at 75 cents per bushel and 
hay at $20 per ton. 
Source: Iowa A/ITicultural Exneriment Station, Sol1s Sub3ection, Response 
of Oats and Alfalfa on Phosphorus-Deficient Soils to Superphos"Ihate Fer-
tUizer. Table 4B, March 1949. 
and other investments. The material in table 8 is adapted 
from a fertilizer experiment in which the residual effect 
of fertilizer applied to oats was measured in increased hay 
yields of the second and third years. The middle column in-
dicates the profit from increased oats yields of the first 
year; the last column presents the over-all profit from oats 
plus residual effects on hay crops. If he paid all seed and 
fertilizer costs and did not discount future returns (as a 
result of the lease) a tenant would find it profitable to apply 
1,200 pounds of phosphate (the point of highest profit is 
boldfaced in the last column). However, if he expects to re-
main on the farm only long enough to ·benefit from the in-
crease in oats yields, he will find it profitable to apply only 
300 pounds of fertilizer per acre (the point of highest profit 
from first year is in boldface in the middle cohimn). 
In practice the operator bases his plans on anticipated 
benefits to be received from the use of fertilizer. These 
anticipated increases in yields may be higher, lower than or 
the same as the results of an experiment looked upon in 
retrospect like the above. The operator's nature (pessimistic 
or optimistic) and conditions peculiar to the individual situ-
ation affect his expectations. While this fact adds to the com-
plexity of the problem, it does not change the principle 
illustrated. As outlined at a later point, the effects of tenure 
uncertainty can be eliminated or offset through various leas-
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TABLE 9. CLARION-WEBSTER SILT LOAM, AMES, IOWA, 1946-1948.· 
, :9:2 
'. Acres of 
::s ct> 
Total :l:; i-a~ land· out Per acre yield product fIJ'H mot: ~ 
croPD'lnf of 100 (lbs.) * .c 1>0 • ct> "::I in ~~~~~i system 
11-1 e~cQ. 
Hay \ Grain 
\ 
0 .... 'C.~ E! 
Corn jsman\ Hay o=<u~oa:l Grain Hay S ~·~.Sb.OO~ grain ~.2"oS ... ~oS 
....,;I tltbto .... ~ 
I I 
32.2/ - I - )180,320 I -C I 0 I 100 I I C·C·O-Cl I 26 76 60.6 I 59.6 1.70 I 217,360 I 85,000 Comple-
I I 63.7\57.8 2.01 \182,333\132,660 mentary C-O·C1 I 33 67 1.4 I I 
• Source: Heady, Earl O. and Jensen, Harald. The economics of crop rota-
tlon .. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 383. 1961. 
t C = corn; 0 = oats; Cl = clover. 
* Corn, 56 Ibs. per bU.; oats, 32. 
ing arrangements. Sharing of costs in proportion to benefits 
received is one such method. 
Another phase of tenure uncertainty affects crop ro-
tations. It is generally accepted that within some range for-
ages are complementary with grain crops on the soils 
studied. Forage is complementary with grain if a greater 
acreage and production of hay results in a greater production 
of grain from a given land area. It becomes competitive when 
an increased production of hay or pasture necessitates a 
reduction in the total production of grain. The complementa-
ry-competitive relationship is illustrated in table 9 for Clari-
on-Webster soils. (Experimental data are not available for 
Tama-Muscatine soils.) A 4-year rotation allows a greater 
production of both hay and grain from 100 acres of land. An 
increase in hay acreage over that suggested by the 3-year 
rotation, however, causes hay to increase at the expense of 
corn. . 
Increased grain crops occur as the use of legumes and 
grasses in the rotation gradually builds up the nitrogen con-
tent, alters ·the soil tilth, and perhaps retards spread of 
diseases that would thrive where only one crop is grown 
continuously. The complementary relationship, therefore, be-
comes apparent only over one and possibly two complete 
cycles of the rotation. Within a single year, hay is always 
'competitive with grain; the more hay grown, the smaller 
must be the total production on the farm in the same year. 
Thus the tenant who will be on his farm for a single year 
must view hay and grain as competitive crops.9 He can bene-
I For the implications of cash rentals on hay acreage, see Heady, Earl O. 
and Jensen, Harald R. The economics of crop rotations. Iowa Agr. Exp. 
Sta. Res. Bul. 383. 1951. 
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fit from the complementary effects only if he is to be on the 
farm for at least a complete rotation cycle. As was indicated 
earlier, about one-half of the tenants make all decisions in 
respect to cropping plans.1o The effects of leasing arrange-
ments on crop acreages for the farms studied are illustrated 
in a later section. 
Apparently landlords are aware of the short-run view 
which can be taken by tenants uncertain of tenure status. 
About one-half of the crop-share and cash tenants in the 
sample indicated that their landlords took a share in the 
management of the farm, at least to the extent of specifying 
a minimum acreage of oats that must be planted (see table 7). 
It is probable that a larger number of leases may have con-
tained standard legal phrases of this sort, but the question 
asked the tenant was whether the landlord specified any 
particular cropping system. 
Uncertainty of tenure need not always cause inefficient 
use of resources. Under crop-share leases landlords may use 
the uncertainty feature to cause the tenant to carryon more 
intensive or even more efficient farming operations; the 
tenant may try to impress the landlord with his industry in 
taking care of the crops and hence secure his stay on the 
farm. There are shortcomings of the system even from the 
landlord's standpoint, however. The tenant has to be cer-
tain that reasonable efforts to please the landlord will assure 
a renewal of th~ lease. Landlords may press this point too 
far; the disgruntled tenant may spend his time trying to "get 
all he can" at the expense of the landlord. 
Even where this is not the case the landlord must take an 
active part in the management if tenure uncertainty is not 
to have undesirable results in the long run. Unfortunately, 
not all landlords can be interested in the most profitable long-
run organization of the farm. Retired farmers and widows of 
farmers depending on the income from a small farm for their 
sole support may be forced to take a short-run view of the 
situation. 
EQUITY AND RISK 
As pointed out before, both cash and crop-share leasing 
arrangements are equally subject to uncertainty introduced 
by the term of the lease. Farmers, however, believe much 
more risk is involved in cash leasing. Their attitude stems 
from the fact that cash leasing effectively reduces the ten-
ant's equity in the business because of the relatively large 
10 Even where the landlord makes the final decision he is apt to be influenced 
by the tenant's attitude, wishes and advice. 
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lump-sum rental fee. Should he experience a bad year it is 
probable that his equity would be severely reduced because 
he is expected to meet these fixed rental payments whether 
he has a crop failure or not. The prevalence of family re-
lationships in cash leasing arrangements may result from 
this condition. Father-son rental arrangements are more 
flexible than lease arrangements between strangers. In the 
case of loss the father can be depended upon in most instances 
to relax the rental requirements or payment arrangements 
even though such provisions aren't written into the lease. 
Relatives would not see as much risk involved in this type 
of lease as strangers and would be willing to have such a 
lease with smaller capital reserves than would someone rent-
ing from a nonrelative. The figures in table 6 tend to bear 
out this hypothesis. Nonrelated tenants tend to have higher 
investments, greater net worth, greater equity and fewer 
liabilities than do related tenants. 
FAMIL Y RELATIONSHIP AND RISK 
As pointed out before, oral leases and family relation-
ships are correlated. This condition may be looked upon as 
evidence of mutual trust existing within the family. Also, 
tenants related to their landlords discounted the future less 
heavily in respect to tenure. Over half of the cash tenants 
as compared to about one-fourth of the crop-share tenants 
were related to· their landlords. Approximately 60 percent 
of all related 11 tenants had oral leases as compared with not 
quite 40 percent of the unrelated cash tenants and one-fourth 
of the unrelated crop-share tenants. 
Also, farm transfer may be taking place in many in-
stances where family relationship between tenant and land-
lord exists. Where the father is helping a son get started, 
the reduced capital position and greater liabilities don't repre-
sent as much uncertainty and risk as they would to strangers. 
The son may be able to draw on his father's reserves in an 
emergency or at least, as pointed out before, ~njoy the bene-
fits of flexibility not written into the lease itself. 
COMPARISONS OF INCOME VARIABILITY U~DER THE 
TWO SYSTEMS OF RENTING 
Since cash rent represents a fixed cost and share rent 
represents a variable cost, the variability of returns should 
be greater under the first as compared to the second system 
11 Related and unrelated tenants refer to tenants related or unrelated to their 
landlords. 
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TABLE 10. VARIABILITY OF TENANT RETURNS FROM CASH AND 
CROP-SHARE LEASED FARMS, 1923-1948. BUDGETED 
COMPARISONS. 
Item 
Average or mean Income 
Average year·to·year change in income 
Average year·to·year change as a percent of 
the mean 
Standard deviation 
Coefficient of variation 
Cash 
$ 2022.85 
$ 1040.29 
51.4 
2021.5 
99.9% 
Crop·share 
$ 1382.84 
$ 670.76 
47.8 
1334.6 
96.5% 
of farming. This is, of course, the notion which farmers ex-
tend. To gain some idea of the degree of variability and 
hence suggest the different degrees of risk and uncertainty 
involved in the two leasing systems in the Tama-Muscatine 
soil area, income variability from crops 12 has been 
"budgeted" for farms or situations in the area. These 
budgets of income were prepared by selecting five townships 
at random for obtaining historic yields over the period 1923-
1948. Then using farms of a size and cropping pattern the 
same as the sample averages for each system, fixed and 
variable costs were computed for each year and applied to 
crop production. Rent under the two systems was subtracted 
on the basis of available data, on rental rates over the periud. 
The resulting data on variability are given in table 10. 
On the basis of these figures, income under a cash lease 
arrangement varies more over a period of years than does 
income under crop-share arrangements. The average change 
in crop income was only a slightly greater percentage of the 
mean under cash lease than under crop-share lease. However, 
the average income under cash lease was larger than under 
crop share (as a result of lower cash rental rates). The year-
to-year fluctuation of the cash renter's income was the lar-
ger, averaging almost $400 greater per year. Also, negative 
incomes appeared in the cash budgets more often than in the 
share budgets. In those years that cash lease budgets showed 
losses, the losses tended to be larger than similar years' 
losses under share lease. 
The computed variability figures, to the extent that 
these serve as an index of degree of uncertainty, do suggest 
somewhat greater risks for the cash as compared to the share 
lease. Thus, it is not inconsistent that a tenant selects a share 
lease over a cash lease. He may value (a) greater certainty 
or (b) less extreme variation in income above a greater 
income itself. 
10 Livestock excluded. Net income as used in this section refers to the dif-
ference between gross field crop returns and expenses of cropping plus rent. 
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RELATIONSHIP OF LEASING SYSTEMS 
TO SCALE OF FARM 
The leasing system may affect farm size or scale through 
two different sources. One of these is the cost of renting 
land under various leasing systems. The other is the effect 
of the leasing system on the capital-equity position of the 
tenant and hence on the degree"of risk or uncertainty which 
surrounds farms of different sizes. The effect of different 
leasing systems on the acres per farm might be illustrated 
by the following example: First, under a share lease with 
the cost per acre at $15 for all crops grown in the rotation, 
the tenant with unlimited capital (and aside from more 
profitable alternatives) could increase total profits by rent-
ing more land up to the point where the yields give him a 
gross return per acre just short of $15. Since the rental cost 
of another acre is equal to the specified share of the crops, 
the tenant gets some return even if the efficiency of farm-
ing operations declines as more acres are operated. In the 
case of a cash tenant, however, with costs of $15 per acre 
and rental rates of $10 per acre, it becomes profitable to 
expand operations only until his gross returns per acre 
are just short of $25 per acre. Generally, the effect of the 
different leasing systems on costs would be to cause cash-
rented farms to be smaller than share-rented farms. 
Risk and uncertainty of renting larger and larger farms 
increase at a more rapid rate for cash than for share farms. 
Obviously cash rent represents a fixed cost which must be 
paid regardless of yield and prices. Also, the amount of fixed 
obligation increases as the acreage operated increases. Cash 
rent becomes an obligation to be repaid at a later time in 
a manner similar to a loan. Thus the larger the acreage 
operated by a tenant with a given amount of assets, the 
smaller is his "effective equity." Under the share lease there 
is no fixed obligation as the scale of operations increases, and 
the "effective equity" of the tenant does not decrease. The 
"increasing risk" under cash leasing thus provides a hy.;, 
pothesis of why farms under this rental system might be 
restricted to sizes smaller than under share leases. 
Aside from the cost and equity considerations mentioned 
above, a variety of other forces may influence the scale of 
farming. A number of these may be interrelated with the 
attitudes and personalities of the tenants to condition the 
actual size of farm operated. A brief discussion of these 
forces is outlined in a footnote,!3 p. 657. Undoubtedly these 
may have a greater impact on the size of rented farms than 
the leasing system itself. 
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SIZE OF FARMS OPERATED 
In the sample analyzed, somewhat smaller farms were 
operated under cash lease than under share lease as shown 
in table 11. These differences in farm size were not signifi-
cant at acceptable levels of probability. However, as tenants 
suggested, the real difference in size of farms operated 
under cash or share leases is affected by the choice of farm-
ing location. If one is interested in operating a large farm, 
he is, perhaps, most likely to scout the opportunities of the 
Cash Grain area of Iowa where traditionally more farms are 
operated on a crop-share basis and where farms are larger. 
If he is interested in renting on a cash basis he is more likely 
TABLE 11. SIZE OF FARMS OPERATED. 
Tenure arrangement 
Cash 
Related 
Nonrelated 
All cash 
Share 
Related 
Nonrelated 
All share 
Average farm size 
in acres 
185 
189 
187 
184 
199 
195 
to be interested in farms such as those found in the area 
studied. There farms are smaller than the state average 
and can be rented under cash lease. This hypothesis' is partly 
substantiated by examination of state figures. The 1945 
census figures show cash-leased farms to average 137.4 
acres while share-cash (share farms as defined here) average 
199.5 acres. 14 ' 
:Ill Whether he is an owner, a share tenant or a cash tenant, the operator's 
choice of farm size Is affected by various factors. The amount of capital 
l;1e owns is important and may limit his operations. It is also possible that 
the larger a farm becomes, the more Intricate are the management prob· 
lems. Thus farming ability and experience are important in deciding the 
size of farm to be operated by anyone individual. Size can create Drob· 
lems of internal organization such as transportation of machinery, live· 
stock, housing (centralized or decentralized) and ability of the manager 
to keep an eye on enterprises such as livestock when they are scattered 
over a wide area. Risk and uncertainty apart from the leasing system can 
act as a deterrent to large-scale farms. Since cash and share tenants also 
differ with respect to the amounts of factors, capital and farmimr experl· 
ence which they possess, it i" obvious that they might tend to prefer farms 
of different sizes even apart from cost and equity considerations. Gener· 
ally the greater capital and exper1ence of cash tenants would favor larger 
farms. 
Accompanying these technical and technological facto·s that affect size 
are certain traditional frictions which prevent free selection of scale of 
operations. Land in the Midwest was laid out according to a rectangular 
survey_ Farms of 160 acres were originally establlshed and it has been 
hard to combine thE'se into larger units. Owners are not always ready to 
sell just because some neighbor is ready to buy an additional 40 acres. 
When they sell, they often prefer to keen an operating unit Intact. Over a 
period of time there has been a gradual increase in farm size throughout 
the state, but 160-acre farms are still the most numerous of anyone size group . 
.. The census designates farms that pay some cash as well as a share as 
share·cash farms. These farms have been defined as share·lease farms for 
the purposes of this study. No livestock share farms are included In the 
current study, however. 
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That the degree of risk as it relates to cash leasing and 
farm size looms important in the minds of tenants is brought 
out in the later section dealing with tenant attitudes. Both 
share and cash tenants considered that because of "increasing 
risk involved in adding acres" under cash rent, the optimum 
size of unit should be greater under share leases. Both 
groups indicated a unit of approximately 150 acres larger 
under a share lease if cash rates were to be at levels giving 
the same rental rates. (See later section on attitudes.) 
INTENSITY AND PRACTICES 
Farmers often express definite opinions on the effect of 
different types of leasing contracts on farming efficiency. 
While most operators agree that cash leases involve the 
greatest risk or uncertainty from the tenant's standpoint, 
many suggest that the cash lease is more conducive to farm-
ing efficiency than the share lease. This idea is expressed 
in farmers' statements such as "under the cash lease the 
tenant receives the full benefit of any superior farm manage-
ment or soil management which he may put into effect, while 
the gains from high managerial ability are shared with the 
landlord under share arrangements" or "good farmers with 
superior managerial ability should rent farms for cash." In 
order to estimate the extent to which tenant farmers 
hold these attitudes and reflect them through the farming 
methods and the quantities of resources employed, compari-
sons of farming intensity have been made between share 
and cash leases. 
EFFECT OF LEASE CONTRACT ON COST STRUCTURE 
Before the data on intensity are examined, it is in-
teresting to examine the basis which may arise for dif-
ferentials in intensity under the two contracts. Cash and 
share leases affect the cost in an altogether different man-
ner. (Share leases affect the cost and return structure.) Cash 
rent acts as a fixed cost; when paid as a given amount per 
acre or as a lump sum for the entire farm, the payment does 
not vary with yield or farm output once the contract has 
been drawn. In contrast, share rent does vary with yield 
or output and hence is more nearly a variable cost. On the 
one hand share rent can be looked upon as a cost item which 
the tenant pays for use of real estate furnished by the land-
lord. On the other hand it can be viewed as a share of the 
product which is imputed to the land and buildings furnished 
by the non-operating partner. In any case it may have effects 
on the intensity of production which is profitable to the 
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TABLE 12. EFFECT OF CASH AND SHARE RENTS ON TENANT 
PROFITS AND ON INTENSITY (HYPOTHETICAL DATA). 
Pounds 
fer-
tillzer 
applied 
(1) 
o 
20 
40 
80 
100 
120 
Added 
pounds 
fer-
tillzer • 
( 2) 
o 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
Cost of added Total fertilizer at yield 10c lb. 
of 
Total I 
(3) 
I 
o I 
~2.00 I 
2.00 I 
2.00 I 
2.00 I 
2.00 I 
'h of corn 
cost 
(4 ) (5) 
I 
o I 50 
H.OO I 58 
].00 I 64 
1.00 I 68 
1.00 I 70 
1.00 I 71 
Adden 
yield 
Irom 
fer-
tillzer t 
\ 6) 
o 
8 
6 
4 
2 
1 
Value of 
corn 
added 
at H.10 
bu. 
(7) 
o 
$8.80 
6.60 
4.40 
2.20 
1.10 
Value added for 
tenant when 
lease is: 
Cash 
(S) 
o 
$8.80 
6.60 
4.40 
2.20 
1.10 
I 'h share. 
(9) 
$4.40 
3.30 
2.20 
1.10 
.55 
• Difference between levels of application Indicated in column 1. 
t Difference between yields shown in column 5 which Indicate amount added 
to total yield by each increment of fertilizer of column 2. 
tenant or the landlord. By intensity of production is meant 
the amount of variable resources such as fertilizer, seed, 
labor, tractor fuel and other input or cost items which may 
be applied to a fixed unit such as an acre of land. Intensity 
also is sometimes considered in the form of farm practices 
application. Thus intensity is increased as the operator ap~ 
plies "distinct practices" such as corn borer control, a new 
and improved variety of crop or seed treatment. 
The possible effect of share and cash rents on the level 
of intensity which is profitable to a tenant is illustrated 
in the example of table 12. Column 1 shows five rates of 
fertilizer application on corn, while column 2 shows the 
amount added between the levels of application. Column 3 
shows the cost of the added fertilizer with a price of 10 cents 
per pound. Column 5 shows the total yield of corn for each 
level of fertilizer application, while column 6 shows the 
amount of corn added to total yield by an additional in-
crement of fertilizer. For example, the first 20 pounds of 
fertilizer added 8 bushels to total yield while the second 
20 pounds added 6 bushels of corn. The fifth increment of 
fertilizer added only 1 bushel of corn to total production. 
Column 7 shows the value of the added corn yield indicated 
in column 6. Columns 8 and 9 indicate the value of the added 
yield to a cash tenant and a share tenant who pays a rent 
equal to one-half the corn yields. 
Under cash renting, it is profitable for the tenant, if he 
has sufficient capital, to add the fourth 20-pound increment 
of fertilizer (i. e., apply 100 pounds in total) since the added 
cost ($2.00 in column 3) of the fourth fertilizer increment 
is less than the added return ($2.20 in column 8) from the 
increment of yield (2 bushels in column 6) forthcoming. The 
cash tenant received the entire yield. The fifth increment 
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of fertilizer is not profitable, since the added 20 pounds cost 
$2.00 (column 3) but add only $1.10 (column 8) to returns. 
The situation is quite different for a tenant who gives a 
one-half share rent but pays all of the fertilizer cost. Under 
this arrangement his added return is that indicated in column 
9 and his added cost is that indicated in column 3. Here it is 
profitable for him to add only the third increment of fer-
tilizer. The fourth increment is not profitable, since its cost 
is $2.00 (column 3) and the return is $1.10 (column 9). 
Thus the share tenant would use less fertilizer per acre than 
the cash tenant, were both to maximize profits. 
However, under appropriate share arrangements the 
same level of fertilizer application can be made profitable to 
both the share and the cash tenant. For example, if the land-
lord and tenant share the fertilizer cost in the same pro-
portion as they share the "product, the same level of fer-
tilizer application is profitable to a tenant under share as 
under cash rent. This fact can be illustrated by referring to 
column 4, which represents the value of one-half of the cost. 
A share tenant realizing these costs and returns (columns 
4 and 9) could profitably apply the fourth unit of fertilizer; 
the added return to the tenant of $1.10 (which is one-half 
the total in column 7) is greater than the added cost of $1.00 
(which is one-half the total fertilizer cost in column 3). 
While a very simple example has been employed, it il-
lustrates the manner in which cash and share leases with 
different provisions may affect the tenant's cost and return 
structure. The principle applies equally to any type of re· 
source input or practice. While the cash tenant does pay 
rent for use of the land, the outlay represents a fixed cost 
and need not affect his decisions through the cost-returns 
complex. While examples have been cited for tenants, the 
same relationship applies to inputs or investments which 
are normally provided by the landlord alone. For example, 
if the landowner" invests in tile and gets back only a half 
share of the crop, it is not profitable for him to make as 
great a tiling investment as would be profitable if (a) the 
tenant paid one-half the cost or (b) he were an owner 
operator. The share and intensity problem does not bear up-
on the tenant in any unique manner but equally affects the 
profitability of landlord investment. 
It should be pointed out that many farm practices or re-
source applications are of a discontinuous nature (i. e., can-
not be applied in varying levels) and they either are or are 
not profitable. Some of these practices or resource appli-
cations are profitable to a landlord or tenant even it he pays 
all of the cost and only receives a share of the product. 
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Finally, there can be provisions in the lease which offset the 
effect different sharing arrangements have on intensity and 
encourage adoption of practices. 
SAMPLE DATA 
Since the effect of share rents upon the intensity of 
production and practices applied in farming has long been 
of concern to economists, tenants and landlords, the study 
was designed to compare intensity and practices under cash 
and crop-share leases. Table 13 includes information on 
selective practices and inputs which apply to crop production. 
The returns from most of the practices listed are mainly 
realized within the year in which they are applied. 
No significant differences exist between share and cash 
leases for the practices enumerated. Three factors might 
account for this lack of difference between cash and share 
leases in the aggregate: (1) The practices might be of a 
discontinuous nature such that returns were greater than 
costs even for a share tenant who pays the entire expense 
but gets back a share of the product. This situation un-
doubtedly holds true for most of the practices included. 
However, it is unlikely to be the case for fertilizer where 
the rate of application can be varied over wide ranges. 
(Many farmers do, however, consider fertilizer as a "dis-
TABLE 13. INTENSITY AS REPRESENTED BY SELECTED PRACTICES 
IN CROP PRODUCTION. 
I Cash I Share 
Item 
Relatedl r~~r~d l Related I r~~r;d l Total Total 
Percent fertilizing corn I I 32.5 34.4 33.3 27.8 42.8 39.2 
Percent fertilizing oats \ 37.5 31.2 34.7 61.1 39.3 58.9 
Percent farms spraying 
\ 16.2 for corn borer 15.0 9.4 12.5 16.7 16.1 
I 
Percent farms with I 
contouring I 5.0 6.2 5.6 0 8.9 6.8 
I 
Percent farms with I 
terracing I 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I 
Percent farms plowing I 
green manure I 37.5 18.8 29.2 27.8 33.9 32.4 
Percent farms gleaning I 
cornfields I 57.5 28.1 44.4 55.6 50.0 51.4 
Av. bu. per acre gleaned I 8.5 10.1 8.9 7.1 7.8 7.6 
Av. rate oat seeding \ (bu.) 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.9 
Percent rolled ground 
for now seeding \ 42.5 58.3 47.1 44.4 46.4 45.9 
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crete practiceU in the sense that it should be applied at some 
recommended rate or not at all.) (2) The effect of family 
arrangements might offset the difference in cost structures 
of share and cash leases. :Significant differences between 
related and nonrelated tenants exist at acceptable levels of 
probability. (See data for related and nonrelated farms in 
table 13.) (3) The manner in which costs and yields are 
divided under the share contract may provide a profit en-
vironment which is equally as conducive to application of 
practices and resources as the cash lease. The possibility 
here was illustrated in the example of table 12; where the 
expense of fertilizer application (column 4) was shared in 
the same manner as the product (column 9), the level of 
fertilizer application which was optimum for the cash tenant 
was also optimum for the share tenant. 
EFFECT OF SHARING METHOD ON FERTILIZER APPLICATION 
The effect of the method of sharing expenses on fertili-
zer application is indicated in table 14. Significant differences 
exist between the two groups of share lease farms both in 
the percentage of farms which applied fertilizer and in the 
rate of application by those farmers who employed the 
practice. Not only was fertilizer applied more often and at 
heavier rates on farms where costs were shared than on 
farms where the costs were not shared; but also these farmers 
employed the practice more frequently and more intensively 
than did cash tenants. Sixty percent of the share tenants 
applied fertilizer on corn where expenses were divided with 
the landlord. Only 33.3 percent of the cash tenants applied 
fertilizer on corn. While the profitability (given the same 
yield response) should be equal on cash rent farms and share 
rent farms where the landlord and tenant divide the costs 
in proportion to shares; it is likely that the landlord's recom-
mendation (or that of the commercial farm manager or 
TABLE 14. EFFECT OF SHARING COSTS ON NUMBER OF TENANTS 
APPLYING FERTILIZER AND ON RATE OF APPLICATION-
CROP·SHARE FARMS. 
Item 
Percent fert1I1zlng corn 
Percent fertll1zlng oats 
PQunds fertilizer applied on 
corn per farm-
Farms where 
landlord shares 
costs 
60.0 
42.2 
5104 
Pounds fertilizer applied on 
oats per farm' 4227 
- Figure Is avera,,"~ for those applying fertilizer. 
Farms where 
landlord doesn't 
share costs 
6.9 
3.4 
795 
466 
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other person representing the landlord) is effective in en-
couraging the adoption of efficient practices where costs as 
well as returns are shared. 
OTHER INTENSITY CHARACTERISTICS 
Production intensity is also affected by the total amount 
of labor and capital applied, to a given land acreage. While 
the practices listed above require capital, proportioning of 
the factors of production also changes as varying quantities 
of livestock and other working capital are employed on a 
farm of given size. Table 15 includes figures for these aspects 
of intensity. 
TABLE 15. GROSS PRODUCT. NET INCOME AND CAPITAL AND 
LABOR APPLIED PER 100 ACRES. 
Item Cash" Share" 
Dollars gross crop product per 100 acres $3772 $4917 
Dollars gross livestock sales per 100 acres 4870 3457 
Total gross product per 100 acres 8642 8374 
Net return per 100 acres 2017 1560 
Working capital per 100 acres 6521 4940 
Months labor per 100 acres 8.7 8.0 
• Includes share of both tenant and landlord. 
Efficiency is attained in one respect when output per 
farm is extended to a level where the additional cost per 
unit approximates the additional return per unit of product. 
Net return measures (with costs computed in a similar 
manner under the two lease forms) indicate that the use 
of pdditional capital and labor on cash-rented farms was 
profitable. Net returns (to the farm as a whole) were about 
$500 greater on the cash-rented farms. To the extent that 
the share contract itself discourages additional levels of 
intensity in livestock production, the leasing arrangement 
is imperfect. While a lower level of intensity may be profitable 
(3,nd "efficient" in this sense) to either the tenant or land-
lord taken alone on a share-rented farm, the use of re-
sources for the farm taken as a unit is not efficient. As long 
as more resources could be employed profitably in the absence 
of the lease agreement, then maximum efficiency is not 
attained from the standpoint of either society or the land-
lord and tenant. If market prices for the products being pro-
duced and the resources employed accurately reflect the 
values which can be placed on either (directly through con-
sumer reflection of choice in commodity prices and indirectly 
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through consumer reflection of the return on or cost of re-
sources used in other alternatives), the consuming economy 
would realize a greater return if resources were transferred 
to rented farms from other employments where returns are 
lower. The landlord and tenant might gain to the extent that 
(a) a greater product exists to be divided between them and 
(b) product and expenses are shared in such a manner that 
the return is greater than the cost for both. 
The particular elements which cause livestock production 
to be carried on more intensely on cash farms are indicated 
by the farmers' attitudes. Farmers express the belief that 
once an operator has enough capital to invest in livestock 
and to withstand the greater risks of this system of oper-
ation, he is better off under the cash lease since here the 
tenant receives the full benefit of any additional crop yields 
forthcoming from the fertility elements provided directly 
from manure and indirectly from the feed processed through 
livestock. Some even go so far as to point out that while the 
landlord may pay part of the fertilizer cost, he does not 
furnish part of the feed cost which later ends up as organic 
fertilizer. Other operators emphasize that many landlords 
wish to sell their share of crops and hence the tenant does 
not have complete decision on disposition of the full grain 
product as he does under cash renting. Some landlords are 
willing to sell their share of the grain to the tenant.. Others 
prefer to store grains for possible price increases. The ten-
ants can, of course, always buy grain in the market. However, 
some seem to have a deeply imbedded notion that greater 
risk or uncertainty surrounds feeding of purchased as com-
pared to home-raised feed. 
The fact that cash tenants have both greater capital and 
greater equities may also explain why intensity of livestock 
production is greater than on share-rented farms. The in-
tensity and capital phenomena may be interrelated in the 
sense that tenant farmers tend to shift from share-rented 
to cash-rented farms as they accumulate funds. The greater 
risk or uncertainty which attends cash renting may also be a 
force which dampens the use of capital and the degree of in-
tensity, even on cash farms where tenants do have greater 
funds. Measurements here were impossible since no group of 
farms was available for comparison. (Comparisons between 
cash-rented and owner-operated farms with similar equities 
exclusive of cash rent would provide a practicable measure 
here.) 
No definite patterns in livestock intensity and gross pro-
ductivity were evident when related and nonrelated tenants 
were compared. Apparently relationships between tenant and 
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landlord are most important in cropping practices which 
directly affect the soil and property of the landlord. A re-
lated tenant may feel that he has greater responsibility in 
efficient use of land because of family ties and affection or 
because he will eventually inherit part of the property. The 
nonrelated tenant does not have a similar tendency in the 
case of real estate. However, the particular incentive does 
not differ between related and nonrelated tenants in the case 
of livestock. Both related and nonrelated tenants own the 
livestock under the two leasing systems studied and they 
alone stand the costs and realize the returns associated with 
different producing systems or practices. (Regardless of 
whether or not he is related to the tenant, the landlord 
does not gain directly from efficient livestock practices nor 
does he suffer directly from inefficient livestock practices.) 
CROPPING SYSTEMS 
In terms of their different effects on the cost and returns 
structure of individual enterprises, cash and crop share leases 
might also lead to varying cropping patterns. Since cash rent 
is a fixed cost and does not relate to the particular com-
bination of crops grown; the cash tenant might be expected 
to employ a cropping pattern similar to that of an owner-
operator faced with the same knowledge, capital limitations 
and tenure expectancy for a particular farm. However, 
where a share tenant pays different proportions of the yield 
as rent for the various crops, the profit ratios differ from 
those for the owner-operator or cash tenants. An example 
may illustrate the possibilities here. The net profit ratio (net 
return per acre for corn divided by the net return per acre 
for oats) is 2.6 for an owner-operator where corn yield is 
58.9 bushels and oat yield is 48.7 bushels (the average for 
all acre costs are $14 and $7 for corn and oats, respectively). 
For a share tenant who realizes the same per acre yields 
and has similar costs, the net profit ratio becomes 2.0. 
Then, too, the profitability of hay or pasture crops may also 
be altered on share lease farms depending on the cash rent 
applied to non-grain crops. If the cash rent charged for hay 
or pasture is very high, it will reduce the profits of these 
crops relative to owner-operated or cash-rented farms. 
While the cash lease tenant pays rent for hay or pasture 
land the same as for other crops, the relative profitability 
of the various crops is not changed because the cash rent is 
a fixed charge which does not attach to any single enterprise. 
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TABLE 16. CROPPING PATTERN ON CROP SHARE AND CASH 
RENTED FARMS. 
Item Cash Share 
Percent of land in row crops ~8.3 48.9 
Percent of land in small grain 22.3 23.4 
Percent of land in grain 60.6 71.3 
Percent of land in hay or pasture 39.4 28.7 
Table 16 indicates the nature of the cropping pattern 
found on share and cash farms included in the sample. These 
figures support the hypothesis that differences might be 
found in cropping systems. In addition to the differential 
effect of the two systems of leasing on the structure of 
costs and returns for various crop enterprises, other factors 
may also be important. The organization of cash rent farms 
to include more livestock would also lead to a greater acreage 
of forage crops. Too, the fact that the cash tenants tend 
to be somewhat older and to be in a more advantageous 
capital position might lead this group to grow more forages, 
which give a deferred income in the form of higher crop 
yields in later years. In contrast, the younger share tenants 
who are more severely limited on capital and who have lower 
equities might be expected to concentrate more on· grain 
crops. These crops give a complete capital turnover in one 
year and do not pose the seeding risk which is involved in 
hay crops. While cash rent is ordinarily considered to in-
volve greater risk than share rent (and hence might place 
a premium on growing quick-return and more certain crops), 
this factor evidently was not strong enough to offset the 
other factors cited above that cause share rent farms to 
grow a relatively greater quantity of grain and a relatively 
smaller quantity of forage. 
Adjustments in the share rent of a single crop as a 
means of making the aggregate returns more equitable (e. 
g., to offset a rent which is too low on another crop) for 
the landlord or tenant may also have the effect of causing 
cropping patterns to differ between share and cash rented 
or owner-operated farms. As has already been pointed out, 
the manner in which soybean production was divided differed 
even within the sample of share lease farms; approximately 
two-fifths included a one-half share while three~fifths of 
the leases specified either more or less than one~half the 
product to the landlord. Obviously the profitability of soy-
beans relative to other crops is changed when the shares on 
the crop are altered to give a greater return to either the 
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tenant or landlord. The two parties may feel that share 
rents on other crops are low relative to the resources 
furnished by the landlord. The share of soybean crop going 
to the landlord can then be increased to offset his lower 
return on other' crops. However, this adjustment immedi-
ately causes the returns to the tenant from soybeans to be 
low as compared to alternative crops such as corn or small 
grains. If the adjustment is made in shares in soybeans 
to offset a lower tenant return on other crops, soybean pro-
duction immediately becomes relatively more profitable to . 
a tenant on this share-rented farm than on a cash rent or 
owner-operated farm. 
OTHER COST ,TRANSFERS WITHIN THE FARM 
The practice of charging a higher or lower rent on one 
crop to offset the rental share on another crop can be con-
sidered a cost transfer between enterprises within the farm 
business. Its effects might be more apparent in an industrial 
firm. If the firm were producing both radios and washing 
machines and costs of $20 per unit were transferred (through 
some outside arrangement)· from washing machines to radios, 
it would immediately become more profitable for the company 
to produce more washing machines and fewer radios. Share 
transfers between farm enterprises are of the same nature. 
While it was not a widespread practice on the share farms 
included in this study, frequently the landlord places a higher 
cash rent on hay or pasture to offset what he (perhaps 
rightly) believes is a rental share for crops. This adjustment 
in effect represents a transfer of rent costs from grain to for-
age crops. If the landlord specifies the rotation for the farm, 
the practice may have no effects in conditioning the cropping 
pattern on the farm. Only about one-half the landlords speci-
fied the cropping system for the share lease farms in-
cluded in this study. However, as some farmers point out, 
the acreage of hay or pasture can be affected by the oper-
ator's action even if the rotation is specified by the landlord. 
Actual management of grass and legume is in the hands of 
the man on the farm. Heavy grazing of first-year stands can 
cause a field to be plowed up and planted to grain in the 
next year. 
Where share rent levels do not give an equitable return 
(in the sense of the productivity of resources furnished) to 
the landlord, other adjustments appear more desirable than 
cost transfers between crops. One obvious possibility is a 
change in the shares of the crops in question (with parallel 
adj ustments in the sharing of expenses between landlord 
and tenant) to give rental rates which are appropriate in 
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terms of market prices and the physical productivity of land 
or other real estate furnished by the landlord. Another possi-
bility is the use of a lump sum cash premium for the farm 
as a unit. While the flat cash payment involves uncertainty 
characteristics, it does not serve as a cost transfer between 
crops if it is of a fixed nature and is not related to any 
single farm enterprise. An even 4 percent of the share ten-
ants included in the study paid a lump sum cash rent. 
As was pointed out in an earlier section, rental arrange-
ments facilitated the most efficient use of farm resources 
when they were in line with the productivity of resources 
furnished by either the landlord or the tenant. Resource 
productivity is not easily determined and perhaps is only 
approximated in a market which functions freely. However, 
many leasing adjustments are possible. Some of these do 
facilitate a combination of enterprises and a use of resources 
in line with market prices and resource productivity; other 
arrangements have the opposite effect. Some contrasts have 
been pointed out. These apply equally for adjustments in re-
tUrns to the tenant. Where it is necessary to lower rents in 
order to give tenant returns consistent with the yield or pro-
ductivity of resources, these adjustments should also be in 
a manner which allows flexibility and causes resources to be 
used most efficiently. 
TENANT ATTITUDE TOWARD LEASING 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Data of previous sections relate to the combinations of 
crops and resources found on farms included in the sample. 
Information was also obtained on tenants' attitudes toward 
the two major leasing systems. A summary of these data 
is included in table 17. 
It should be remembered, of course, that a process of 
selection between tenant and leasing systems has already 
taken place. Tenants with greater capital and ability un-
doubtedly have hunted out farms which rent for cash. The 
same tendency also applies to tenants who feel that their 
capital and managerial positions best fit them for a farm 
rented under a share lease when they prefer a cash lease 
(and vice versa). Others may have started to operate under 
one kind of lease but have accumulated capital or experience 
which causes them to prefer the opposite lease. An interest-
ing contrast is illustrated in line 1 of table 17. Only 5 per-
cent of the tenants operating under a cash lease would prefer 
.~ share arrangement. Nearly 50 percent of the share tenants 
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TABLE 17. TENANTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD CROP·SHARE AND CASH 
LEASING ARRANGEMENT. 
Item 
I Cash 
R~lated I r~~~d I All 
I I 
1. Percent who prefer I 1 
~~~~e l~e:ss:: over 1 5.0 I 
I I 
2. Percent who believe 1 I 
cash leases encourage I 
greatest farming 1 1 
efficiency I 57.5 I 
3. Estimated cash rent-
al rate which would 
have given same reo 
turn as customary 
share rents in 1949 
I I 
I I 
1 1 I 11 $18.84 
I I 
4. Cash rent operator 1 I 
would be w!lling to I 
pay If he were to 1 I 
shift from a share to \ 
a cash lease· $12.13 
5. Size of farm operator \1 I 
would prefer to rent I 
under customary I 
shares 272.8 I 
I I 
6. Size of farm tenant 1 1 
would prefer to oper- I 1 
ate under cash rent 1 I 
which gives return I I 
equal to that of cus- I I 
tomary share lease \ I (the rent level Indi- I 
cated in line 3) I 143.0 I 
I 1 
7. Size of farm tenant 1 I 
would prefer to oper- I 1 
ate under a cash rent I I 
at the discounted I I 
level (the rent level 1 I 
Indicated In line 4) I 239.8 
6.2 5.6 
43.8 51.4 
$18.85 $18.84 
$12.48 $12.29 
194.5 263.1 
58.6 110.7 
207.0 224.8 
I Share 
Non-
Related 1 related 1 All 
38.9 
1
1 
33.3 
I 
I 
$20.25 I 
I 
1 
$13.44 I 
I 
"'·'1 
I 
131.1 I 
I 
190.0 I 
44.6 
32.1 
$20.55 
$11.97 
259.4 
103.1 
222.2 
I 
I 
I 43.2 
I 
1 
I 
I 32.5 
I 
I 
I $20.48 
I 
1 
! $12.33 
I "" 
I 
1 109.9 
I 
I 
I 
1 214.3 
• Figure for cash tenants indicates the rent which they would be willing to 
pay if they also had the opportunity to rent for a share basis. 
would prefer a cash lease. Two reasons are paramount in 
explaining these preferences. Many tenants believed the cash 
lease (1) to facilitate greater farming efficiency and (2) to 
be more profitable than share rental rates in effect. Over 
one-half the tenants operating under cash leases believed 
this form of rental contract to encourage greatest efficiency. 
Nearly one-third of the share tenants also nreferred the cash 
lease in terms of its efficiency characteristics. 
RISK DISCOUNT AND FARM SIZE 
Indication of tenant estimates of the 1949 profitability 
of cash as compared to share renting is given in line 3. 
Share tenants estimated that cash rents would have to 
average slightly over $20 if both leases were to have given 
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equal returns in 1949. Estimates of cash tenants averaged 
nearly $19 (in contrast to the average of $10.29 actually 
paid by cash tenants). However, tenants would not be in-
different as to the type of lease were cash rates to be at the 
above levels. Because of the greater risk they feel to be 
inherent in cash leases, both share and cash tenants would 
be willing to rent for, cash only if some discount were pos-
sible. The magnitude of this "risk discount" associated with 
cash leases is suggested by comparing line 4 with line 3 in 
table 17. 
Both groups of tenants indicated that while cash rents of 
$18 to $20 would have given returns to the tenant equal to 
those under share renting, they would be willing to operate 
under a cash lease only if rents were in the neighborhood 
of $12. 
Subjective evidence does indicate that farmers relate 
farm size to the type of lease and the degree of uncertainty 
attached to it. When asked to indicate the size of farm which 
would be optimum (in terms of the individual tenant's own 
capital and managerial position), cash and share tenants 
indicated a size approximating 220 acres. However, for a 
cash lease system with rents at a level giving returns equal 
to the customary share rent, both groups specified a unit 
of around 110 acres. The interest in a smaller farm at the 
cash rent level comparable to the customary share rent 
grows mainly out of two things: (1) The greater degree of 
"uncertainty" (chance of loss in unfavorable years) involved 
in cash renting. The larger the farm rented under a cash 
lease, the greater is the fixed payment which must be made 
in any particular year regardless of the production. (2) The 
fact that cash rent represents a constant marginal cost per 
acre of land rented while share rent represents a marginal 
cost which varies with the return from any additional land 
operated. If the return per acre declines as the size of the 
farm is increased, the same cash rent must be paid and net 
profit per acre declines (or may even become zero). Under 
share leasing the rental rate declines if the returns fall as 
the size of the unit is expanded. Farmers express these 
notions both directly in their reasons for favoring a smaller 
farm under cash rent and indirectly in their general ex-
pressions of the degree of risk associated with cash rents. 
Given the opportunity, tenant farmers indicate that they 
would operate larger farms under a cash rent which is at the 
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"risk discount"15 level than under a cash rent equivalent to 
the customary share rent. (See lines 6 and 7.) While the atti-
tudes expressed indicated preference for smaller farms than 
under customary share rents, the average size indicated 
more nearly parallels the optimum scale for the share lease 
than for the earlier cash figure (i. e., the cash rent level 
which would equalize returns to the tenant when compared 
to the customary share rent). Since the levels of rent (line 
4) approximate (are only slightly higher than) those actually 
being paid in the area, it may well be true that while the 
risk attached to present cash rents has only slight effects 
in limiting scale of operations under leases of this type, the 
effect of cash rents on scale might be materially greater 
were rent levels to be raised to levels where tenant returns 
parallel those under share renting. 
CHANGES IN FARM ORGANIZLTION UNDER OWNERSHIP 
Questions were asked to determine whether tenants 
would change their operation if they owned the farms upon 
which they live (table 18). Roughly one-half of the opera-
tors interviewed suggested that they would operate their 
farms differently were they owners with full decision-mak-
ing power. Significant differences did not exist between share 
tenants as a group and cash tenants as a group. Significant 
differences did exist, however, for most items between those 
tenants who were related to the landlord and those who 
were not related. As has already been pointed out, the ten-
ant who is operating the farm owned by his parents is very 
closely associated with ownership, and the economic in-
terests of the tenant and landlord are often parallel. 
Changes were more often suggested in crop organization 
than in livestock organization. This difference again is in 
line with the earlier suggestion that since the tenant has 
control over livestock for both of the systems of leasing 
studied, the rental arrangement is most important as it 
affects crop combinations and practices. Changes in build-
ings also ranked high in the minds of tenants. Both share and 
cash tenants emphasized that buildings should be added or 
repaired if farming were to be carried on in the most efficient 
:IS The term "risk discount" rent Is used for the sake of slmpl1city to Indi-
cate the level of cash rent which tenants feel would be necessary for them 
to be equally as willing to rent a farm for cash as for the customary share 
rates. Thus the difference between this level (line 4 of table 17) of cash 
rent and the one (line 3 of table 17) which tenants feel would give a re-
turn equal to that of the share lease may be lOOked upon as the risk dis-
count related to the greater subjective uncertainty which attaches to cash 
rents. We do not make an attempt to make a rigid distinction between 
risk and uncertainty in the manner of conventional economic terminology. 
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TABLE 18. SUG'GESTED CHANGES IN FARM ORGANIZATION OR 
ENTERPRISE COMBINATION TENANTS WOULD MAKE 
UNDER OWNER OPERATION. 
I Cash I Share 
Item 
Related 1 r~~r~d I Related I r~~r~d I All All 
Percent who would I I 
change organization if I 
they owned the farm I 42.5 59.4 50.0 44.4 55.4 52.7 
Percent who would I 
make crop changes I 35.0 46.9 40.3 18.7 50.0 41.9 
Different rotation I 10.0 18.8 13.9 11.1 19.6 17.6 
More pasture 5.0 21.9 12.5 11.1 17.8 16.2 
Contour 2.5 3.1 2.8 '0 3.6 2.7 
Less corn 0 0 0 0 7.1 5.4 
Percent who would 
make livestock 
changes 5.0 6.2 5.6 22.2 12.5 14.8 
More hogs 5.0 0 2.8 0 1.8 1.4 
More cattle 0 0 0 18.7 5.4 8.1 
Percent who would 
make changes in 
building and fences 32.5 59.4 44.4 27.8 58.9 51.4 
Rearrange buildings 
and fences 5.0 3.1 4.2 5.6 1.8 2.7 
Repair buildings 
and fences 
Build new build· 
2.0 43.8 30.6 11.1 26.8 23.0 
ings and fpnces 12.5 25.0 18.0 18.7 23.2 21.6 
Remodel buildings 0 3.1 1.4 5.6 7.1 6.8 
manner (including both the scale and combination of crop 
and livestock enterprises). 
COMPARISON OF RENTAL RATES AND DERIVED 
MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY STATISTICS 
Rental rates represent prices paid for the use of re-
sources (or resource services) furnished by the landlord. 
Resource prices perform two roles in an economic system. 
One function of these prices is to allocate (divide up) the in-
come to the different resource owners. The other function 
of prices is to bring about the best use of combination of re-
sources. This second role of rental rates as prices for the 
resources furnished by the landlord gives rise to problems in 
production economics or resource efficiency (farm manage-
ment in the applied terminology) .16 Accordingly, this section 
is devoted to a comparison of rental rates and the marginal 
,. The first function, the aIIocation of the product or Income, Is a problem 
in income distribution. Prices mayor may not result in an "equitable" 
distribution of Income (e. g., a dlvlson of Income which will result In a 
maximum satisfaction or utility to the community of individuals con-
cerned). Rental rates as prices perhaps should never be used to shift In-
come between individuals if (a) they are expected to and do serve ef-
fiCiently in bringing about the most efficient combination and use of re-
sources and (b) other appropriate means of making income shifts are 
avallable. 
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productivity of the land resources furnished by landlords. 
If rental rates are to be used as the means to bring about 
the most efficient use of resources and pattern of production, 
then they should approach the marginal productivity of 
landlord resources (with proper modifications to allow for 
discounts growing out of risk and uncertainty). If rental 
'rates are below the productivity of resources furnished by 
landlords, returns to tenants will be greater than they would 
otherwise be, and increased numbers of persons will be will-
ing to devote their capital and labor resources to operating 
farms on a rented basis. (More and smaller farms may exist 
than if rental rates were to equal or approach the marginal 
productivity of landlord resources.) Rental rates above pro-
ductivity levels might well have an opposite effect. Lower re-
turns to tenants tend to discourage persons from bringing 
their capital into agriculture and operating rented farms. 
Thus in order to compare rental rates with resource pro-, 
ductivity, estimates of the marginal value prod,uctivity of 
landlord resources were derived from the statistics of the 
study.H Table 19 allows comparison of rental rates and 
marginal productivities (computed at the mean). 
TABLE 19, RENTAL RATES AND ::\IARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY 
ESTUIATES. 
Item 
Average landlord rental return per acre on share·rcnt farms 
Average landlord return per acre on cash·rent farms 
Mean marginal value productivity per acre 
Marginal productivity at upper fiducial limit' 
Marginal productivity at lower fiducial limit' 
Value 
$18.90 
10.29 
31.42 
37.39 
25.45 
• Range Is based on fiducial limits at the 5 percent level of probability. The 
regression cocfflcient used in deriving the marginal productivity of land 
was sIgnificant at the 1 percent level. 
Cash rents are obviously expected to be lower than share 
rents because of the greater discount of returns growing out 
of the risk and uncertainty under this system of renting. 
In fact they were only slightly greater than one-half the re-
turn realized by share rent landlords. It is known, of course, 
that cash rents adjust slowly to changing prices while share 
rents immediately adjust (since the value of the landlord's 
share goes up immediately with the price). As is suggested 
'1 These were derived from a production function of the form Y = 
aX,bX.cX.·X.e where Y refers to the value of product, X, refers to land-
lord services (land and buildings) as measured in acres, X. refers 'to labor 
in months. Xs refers to machInery and power services and X. refers to 
crop servlccs (with the latter two measurcd In dollars). Coefficients were 
as follows: Y = .9069X,,79" X.·12," X.·OOO5 X"O"". All farms in the sample 
were employed In deriving the coeffIcients. 
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in a later section, both share and cash tenants considered 
the existing level of cash rents to allow considerably greater 
returns to the tenant than the customary share rents. Even 
after allowing for discounts due to the greater risk or uncer-
tainty of cash leases, most operators interviewed considered 
the two types of rents to be quite far apart in respect to ten-
ant or landlord returns. (Note the level of cash rent which 
tenants suggested in an earlier section with respect to differ-
ent situations.) 
The derived statistics on marginal productivity of land 
per acre are also given in table 19. Actual rents paid under 
share leases averaged only about two-thirds of the mean of 
the marginal productivity figure. They even fall below the 
productivity figure computed at the lower limit of 5 per-
cent confidence interval. It should be remembered, of course, 
that the productivity figures are computed from production 
. which had already become history; rent as a price paid for 
land must involve anticipation of outcomes in the future 
when returns are uncertain. Some divergence between value 
productivity and rents might thus be expected. However, to 
the extent that the derived statistics are acceptable esti-
mates of the value productivity of land, the share rental 
rates (and even the cash rates unless very great allowances 
must be made for risk and uncertainty under the system of 
renting) fall quite a distance below the computed value of 
productivities. 
This finding should perhaps be looked upon as a hypothesis 
for futUre study. IS However, it does not appear out of line 
with long-term and recent developments in yields, prices and 
consumer demand. The share rental rates on farms in the 
area have not changed greatly (and typically not at all) 
from rental rates of several decades back. Not only have 
techniques such as hybrid corn and other innovations in-
creased the physical productivity of these soils by a large 
amount relative to other areas,tu but also the heavy demand 
,.. Other empirical procedures for estimating marginal value productivities 
were considered but were not employed either (a) because of their com-
plexity or (b) because the detail and cost Involved did not appear to war-
rant the outlay involved. Under some of the leases, the landlord did not 
contribute resources other than land. Some did contribute one·half the crop 
services. When productivity figures per acre were adjusted for the land-
lord's share of the marginal value productivity of crop services, however, 
rental rates paid still did not closely approximate the derived product 
figures. 
to For some comparisons of changes in physical productlvlties see Heady, 
Earl 0., "Basic enonomic and welfare aspects of farm technological 
change." .Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. XX. ::\fay 1949. 
'Vhile an Increased physical prodUctivity need not Increase value pro-
ductivity of resources, the relative gain In yield on Tama-Muscatlne solls 
likely places this area high In respect to Increased returns per acre of land. 
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for food in the postwar period has caused prices to increase 
the value contribution of land and other factors of production. 
Most important, it should be emphasized that rental rates, 
whether they be share or cash, should be flexible and allowed 
to adjust as the productivity of various resources furnished 
by the landlord or tenant rises or falls. Cash rental rates 
have risen considerably since the outbreak of the Korean 
war. Hence the productivity estimates and rental rates pre-
sented above should not be taken as existing at present. 
Some indication that rental rates in the area studied are 
not completely in line with the current productivity or re-
sources was indicated by the pressure for readjustment of 
rental rates. Tenants indicated that this pressure is being 
brought about through landlord interest in shifting from cash 
leases to share leases or from crop share leases to live-
stock share leases.2o The pressure seems to be to shift from 
one lease to another rather than to change rental rate for 
a given type of lease. Landlords were evidently using this 
means of increasing their returns from the farms. It is. 
practically the only method open for readjustment of rents 
where there is not enough flexibility in the leasing system. 
From an economic efficiency or farm management stand-
point it appears desirable that flexibility in rents should exist 
within a single lease type as well as between leasing systems. 
'" Preliminary reports from the 1950 census shown below bear out this no-
tion. In nearly all of the cropping areas of Iowa there has been a definite 
shift away from cash leases to share·cash. Share·cash leases as defined by 
the U. S. Census contain most of the crop·share leases as the term Is used 
in this bulletin. This change is probably a result of landlord discontent 
with the relativelv low return from cash leases. Landlords find it easier 
to change the lease type than the rental rate. On the other hand, there has 
been a shift away from share and cropper leases, the category that con-
tains most of the livestock-share leases as defined in this bulletin. At the 
present Ume ·tenants have fairly large amounts of capital. Therefore, they 
resist any shift toward livestock-share leases and hunt for crop-share or 
cash arrangements where they can enjoy the returns from their capital. 
I 
II 
111 
IV 
V 
KIND OF TENANT CHANGES BETWEEN 1946 AND 1950.· 
Area 
'\Vestern 
North Central 
Northeastern 
Eastern 
Southern 
State total 
Percent Percent s*i[ii~t share Percent I I Ip I Percent I tenanc" cash cash and other 
cropper 
- 9.1 1-38.8 I 77.4 1-41.7 I 22.8 - 4.1 1-36.3 49.4 
-45.31-12.3 
-15.5 1-38.1 I 59.7 1-22.2 - 0.5 -25.3 -49.0 0.6 -34.4 -42.0 
-13.4 I -40.3 I 65.8 -24.1 -27.7 
-12.1 1-39.8 I 50.9 I -34.3 I -23.7 
• Negative percentages refer to a reduction in number of the lease type in 
question and positive percentages to an increase in number of the lease type 
In question. 
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LANDLORD CONSIDERATION 
The data of this study indicate the nature in which re-
sources are used on tenant-operated farms under cash and 
share leases. The attitudes measured are those of tenants 
only. Complete understanding of forces which affect farm-
ing efficiency under lease arrangements can be obtained only 
as landlord reasoning is also studied. Enumeration of landlord 
attitudes was outside the scope of this st).ldy but may be 
investigated at a later time. It should be emphasized again, 
however, that those same imperfections in share leasing 
arrangements which affect the tenant's action in respect to 
use of resources also affect the landlord in a similar manner. 
The tenant may justly limit the amount of resources in the 
form of fertilizer where he pays the full cost and receives 
only one-half the production. Similarly, the landlord is en-
tirely rational when he refuses to invest in tile or terracing 
for a similar reason. Perhaps buildings represent an even 
more important case; if he is able to obtain no rent for 
. addition or repair of buildings, the landlord is economically 
justified in investing funds in other alternatives where he 
does realize a return on his money. (Some landlords do obtain 
an indirect rent on building investment through being able 
to obtain tenants who are better managers.) 
INCREASING EFFICIENCY AND RESOLVING 
CONFLICTS 
This study has dealt mainly with the effect of various 
rental arrangements on farming efficiency. Cash or share 
leases also have particular advantages to the tenant or land-
lord. Generally a cash lease returns more than a share lease 
(a) to the tenant when prices are rising, and (b) to the 
landlord when prices are falling. This situation holds true 
since cash rental rates lag behind general changes in the 
level of farm prices. While the cash lease is advantageous to 
the tenant with ample capital, superior managerial ability 
and the finances to stand greater risk, it is advantageous 
to the landlord who wishes to free himself of all managerial 
tasks and wishes to be more certain of his annual income. 
Conversely, the share lease is most desirable from the stand-
point of the landlord who can stand greater risks and wishes 
to receive a higher return on his investment over time; share 
rents return the landlord more for his land over a long 
period, since cash rents tend to fall at a level which remuner-
ates the tenant for bearing the greater share of the risk. 
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EFFICIENCY UNDER LEASING 
While it is nowhere near universally true, both crop 
share and cash leases may have characteristics which tend 
to discourage farming efficiency. These imperfections are 
not inherent in leasing systems themselves but rather in the 
particular arrangements which have become customary over 
time. It is entirely possible that farming can be carried on 
just as efficiently on rented farms as on owner-operated 
farms. In order that this situation hold true it would be 
necessary that both minor and major adjustments be made 
in leasing arrangements. An outline of the direction of ad-
justments which may promote efficiency is listed below 
along with a brief summary of the particular arrangements 
which have bearing on farming operations. 
Cash Leases: 1. The cash lease may cause farmers to 
center their farm organization around relatively certain en-
terprises and to restrict its total scale because of the greater 
subjective risk which attaches to cash rent. This tendency 
may be alleviated through sliding-scale or flexible cash rents 
which allow the rental payment to fluctuate with farm prices. 
Then, too, this system tends to alleviate disparities in land-
lord and tenant returns which grow out of the lag between 
changes in farm prices and rental rates. The effect of cash 
rent as a constant marginal cost on farm size does not repre-
sent a leasing imperfection; aside from other market im-
perfections, the scale of the farm so determined conforms 
with efficient utilization of resources. 
2. The length of tenure may cause inefficiency to arise 
on either a share or cash lease farm. Mere expectancy that 
the lease may be terminated can lead to uncertainty and 
inefficient planning in farm operations. Short leases are not 
without advantages. The threat of lease termination may be 
used as a means of bringing the tenant to practice efficient 
farming. The old saying "a short lease but a long tenure" 
may have important substance; if a tenant knows that he 
is secure when he farms efficiently but is subject to eviction 
if his methods of operation become faulty, he may be en-
couraged to carryon efficient farm operations. This arrange-
ment should exist only where rental rates are equitable in 
a sense that tenant and landlord returns conform to the 
quantity and productivity of resources furnished by both 
parties. It is true, however, that some farms are operated 
under I-year leases which include no suggestion of continued 
tenure action even. if the unit is operated effectively. It 
is under arrangements such as these that plans are on a 
year-to-year basis and favor continued use of resources for 
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row crops. Possible means of eliminating this imperfection 
include (in addition to the "short lease-long tenure" arrange-
ment mentioned above) (a) longer leases and (b) compen-
sation for unexhausted resources such as fertilizer, lime, 
nitrogen from legumes, contours and terraces which the 
tenant might apply. . 
Share Leases: 1. The crop lease may discourage efficien-
cy where the shares of expenses and production are not the 
same. The extreme case here is represented when either land-
lord or tenant pays the full variable expense of a practice 
but receives only a share of the product. While all im-
perfections would be removed under a complete partnership 
with both parties owning a share in all resources and divid-
ing income and expenses in a parallel manner, other practic-
able arrangements can be made. At the minimum, tenant 
and landlord should divide expenses in the same manner as 
the product is shared for those practices and resource in-
vestments which would not otherwise be carried on. This 
arrangement should apply to those investments which are 
customarily made by the landlord as well as those which often 
are borne by the tenant alone. Or, the landlord and tenant 
could get together and estimate the costs and return from 
an investment which represents an exception to customary 
leasing arrangements. For example, a tenant may desire a 
milk house which meets market sanitary regulations in order 
that whole milk can be sold. Customary share leasing arrange-
ments may not provide for rent to the landlord for the type 
of investment. Yet the tenant and landlord might estimate 
the total investment which would be entailed by the latter. 
Then the increase in tenant returns from the sale of whole 
milk can be calculated. If the additional returns more than 
cover the additional tenant expenses, then the milk house 
investment can be economically justified. The two may then 
compute the interest which the landlord should have if he 
is to realize as much on this investment as on other invest-
ment alternatives. The additional rent may be set at this 
level. Under this arrangement both the. tenant and the land-
lord can benefit (at least neither will be worse off relative to 
other investment alternatives). If the added investment can-
not meet the test of giving returns to the landlord or tenant 
as great as exist for other investment opportunities, then 
there is little economic justification for the addition. 
2. A shift of share rent between crop enterprises or the 
addition of a cash rent premium on forage to offset low 
rents on grains causes the cost structure to be distorted 
to favor one crop at the expense of another. If premiums 
are to be charged, they should be in the form of a fiat rent 
per farm or per acre and should not be attached to any single 
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crop. (Rents of this nature are sometimes called privilege 
rents.) While the cash characteristics may.add to uncertainty 
or risk considerations, the· latter can also be lessened by 
flexible or sliding~scale arrangements which are tied to the 
price level. As long as share rents continue to be a pre~ 
dominant form of renting, it appears that the leasing ar-
rangements should be made flexible. Rental rates should 
rise or fall with the productivity of either landlord or ten-
ant resources. While custom has become deeply imbedded in 
the share rates of many areas, these customary rental ar-
rangements need not be perpetuated without variation into 
the future. 
From the standpoint of efficiency, the rental rates and 
shares to the 'landlord and tenant represent a price or re-
turn for the resources furnished by either. The price or 
return for resources in a market economy performs the 
function of causing resources to be used in a manner con~ 
sistent with the preferences of the nation's consumers. 
While income transfers can be made between tenant and 
landlord, rental arrangements should not be used for this 
explicit purpose. Neither tenants nor landlords represent 
a distinct economic group from which returns should be 
transferred in order that the other can have more income. 
Only when it can be determined that rates in the market 
depart from the quantity and productivity of resources 
furnished by landlord or tenant should alterations be made 
in rental levels. However, rental rates should be made flex-
ible in order that they can readily adjust to these levels. The 
problem of income transfers is quite apart from efficiency 
considerations. 
Means other than rental adjustments exist whereby in-
come can be transferred between landlords and tenants. Since 
use of an important portion of farm resources is obtained in 
the market through leasing arrangements, emphasis should 
be placed on leasing arrangements which encourage farm-
ing efficiency. This statement applies particularly to the 
period ahead when extreme pressure for production is apt 
to be applied on the resources of the nation. It is entirely 
possible that farming efficiency on rented farms can be at 
a level which approaches or surpasses that of owner~operated 
farms. There is an important place for rented farms in the 
nation's economy. Improvement of leasing arrangements 
can help insure the permanent role of the rented farm as 
(a) a method of operation for those individuals with limited 
funds who choose agriculture as an occupation and (b) an 
investment opportunity for non~farmers who wish to earn 
returns in agriculture comparable to returns in other in-
dustries. 
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APPENDIX A 
ATTITUDE TOWARD EFFICIENCY OF LEASES 
Crop-share farmers who thought crop-share leases resulted in inore" 
efficient farming gave the following reasons for their belief_ Reasons 
are in order of their prevalence: 
1. Landlord takes greater interest under crop-share lease_ 
2. Cash farmers deplete soil or run down the farm. 
3. Less risk for tenant, or landlord shares the risk. 
Those crop·share farmers who thought cash leases were conducive 
to more efficient farming gave these reasons for their viewpoint: 
1. Tenant receives the full benefits from better practices and his 
efforts and therefore has greater incentive to do more. 
"2. Cash tenants raise more livestock. 
3. Tenant has more independence. 
4. More profitable for the tenant. 
Cash tenants who thought cash leases encouraged the more efficient 
farming gave the following reasons in order of prevalence: 
1. The tenant receives the returns from ability and effort, so he 
has incentive to do better job. 
2. Farming under cash lease is more profitable. 
3. There is no inconvenience of crop division which causes land-
lord·tenant friction. 
4. More feeding and livestock raised under cash leases. 
5. Tenant is more independent. 
S. Two persons thought crop-share tenants "crop harder" than 
cash tenants. 
Those cash tenants who considered crop-share leases more en-
couraging to efficiency gave these reasons: 
1. Landlord takes greater interest. 
2. Tenant takes greater interest. 
3. Risk is divided. 
4. Landlord does bbtter job of keeping up improvements and 
furnishes more. 
APPENDIX B 
FUNDAMENT AL CONCEPTS 
The hypotheses upon which this study is based are drawn from 
(a) the observations extended by landlords, tenants and others ac-
quainted with leasing systems and processes and (b) the fundamental 
economic relationships or models which underlie leasing arrangements. 
The fundamental economic hypotheses and models which parallel those 
furnished by farms are presented in brief detail here. The reader in-
terested in a more explicit explanation of these models is referred to 
Heady, Earl 0., "Economics of Farm Leasing Systems," Journal of 
Farm Economics, August, 1947_ 
UNCERTAINTY 
The lease may create uncertainty beyond that which would normally 
exist in the market as shown in fig. 1. 
Curve RN represents the expected marginal return from the in-
put of resources when there is no uncertainty as to the outcome. 
Curve RM represents the marginal return discounted for normal mar-
ket uncertainties. -Curve RL represents the marginal return discounted 
for normal market uncertainties and also for additional uncertainty 
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M 
created by the lease. In 
the absence of uncer-
tainty the firm would 
invest the quantity of 
resources equal to ON. 
Under normal market 
and technological un-
certainties, the future 
may be discounted and 
a quantity of resources 
equal to OM employed 
by the firm. When the 
lease causes additional 
uncertainty, discount of 
returns will be still 
greater (RL) and in-
N vestment of resources 
extended only to OL. 
Where the returns 
F· 1 uncertainty created by the lease. for each enterprise are 
Ig. .. discounted equally, the 
effect is to curtail the over-all scale of operations of the firm. When 
the degree of uncertainty is not the same for each enterprise, the firm 
tends to divert its resources from those in which uncertainty is great 
to those in which it is relatively less. 
COST CONSIDERATIONS 
When rent is a function of output as under crop-share lease, it 
becomes a part of marginal costs. The Mal curve in fig. 2 represents 
marginal costs for various outputs under cash lease. MO. represents 
output for a one-third-share lease where part of tLe output is paid as 
rent. The marginal cost for a one-half-share lease represented by MO. 
is equal to the marginal cost under cash lease plus one-half of the 
output when rent is considered a cost for the use of resources. Since 
the firm equates MO with MR at equilibrium, the tenant would extend 
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PRICE 
Me,! 
output to OP under 
cash rent as compared 
to ON under share rent. 
For example, fertilizer 
application by the ten-
Me. ant or tiling by the 
landlord would only be 
extended until the 
higher marginal cost 
(includes one-half of 
the product) equals the 
marginal returns from 
resources or practices. 
When costs from one 
enterprise are shifted 
to another as a result 
of the lease. the condi-
tions illustrated in fig. 
3 arise. For example. 
raising pasture rent to 
compensate for better 
N P buildings raises the 
OUTPUT marginal cost for pas-
Fig. 2. Marginal costs and outputs under crop- ture (Mad to MO •• ) and 
share lease. lowers the marginal 
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Fig. 3. Costs of one enterprise shifted to another. 
cost for buildings (MObl to MOb.)' Where the firm is free to shift re-
sources between enterprises it will tend to cut pasture production 
back to OM' and expand use of buildings (more non·forage·consuming 
livestock from which the tenant receives full return) from OP to ON. 
SCALE OF' FARMING 
The situation where rent for land is a share of the product is 
shown in fig. 4. Line MI' is the marginal product of land. LP Is 
the cost (share of the product) of land. With other costs held constant, 
1. e., given factors such as cet of machinery, labor and capital, it 
pays the firm to continue operations to output OP. As long as the 
product from land is positive, the marginal cost is less (one·half 
the product) and therefore profitable to expand. Forces acting 
against this tendency for share tenants to continue extension of 
scale to this extreme arc discussed in the text. 
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Fig. 4. Rent for land 
as a share of the product. 
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INFLEXIBILITIES IN SUPPLY OF FACTORS 
• 
A fixed supply of specialized resources established within the firm 
where input of these is not related to their marginal productivity is 
shown in fig. 5. MS represents marginal returns to .A. with resources 
.A. and B both variable. MR represents returns to .A. with B fixed. 
(Result of diminishins returns to .A. with B fixed.) ON is marginal re-
return on a third resource, O. When the marginal revenues are equated 
between enterprises, output OP rather than OQ results when <ome of 
the specialized factor proportions are fixed by the lease. 
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Fig. 5. Inflexibilities 
of inputs or factors. 
